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Treatment of American POWs in Vietnam CIA Files

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Treatment of American POWs in Vietnam CIA Files

126 pages of selected CIA files dating from 1966 to 1971. The files concern the treatment of American POWs. The files cover: The exploitation of U.S. POWs for propaganda purposes. Experiences of American pilots captured in Vietnam. Intelligence on Hoa Lo Prison, also known as Hanoi Hilton. Lessons used in the indoctrination of American POWs. North Vietnamese policy toward American POWs. The Viet Cong practices involving the taking of POWs. The air raids that took place in and around Hanoi during the period of time of McCain's last sortie. The use of POWs for propaganda broadcasts. The Viet Cong prison system for Vietnamese under their detention.

NOTES:

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Case # NLJ 92-434
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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• ROUTINE

IN

70

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FXO, DDI

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141901Z

CITE

DIST 14 MARCH 1967

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI JUNE TO AUGUST 1966
SUBJECT VIET CONG POLICY TOWARD AND EXPLOITATION OF
U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON

SOURCE

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1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
AUGUST 1993

IN -21345

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

1. (SUMMARY. VIET CONG (VC) POLICY TOWARD PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) WHICH DATES BACK TO THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH IS STILL APPLICABLE TO U.S. POW'S. BASICALLY, THE CAPTURING OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES IS ENCOURAGED, IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE, PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL PURPOSES. THIS POLICY HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN CARRIED OUT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE VC TROOPS WERE NOT AWARE OF IT, BECAUSE THEY SOUGHT TO AVENGE THEIR COMRADES BY KILLING THE ENEMY, BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERS TO THE COMMAND POST, AND BECAUSE IT WAS EASIER TO KILL POW'S WHEN THE UNIT HAD TO WITHDRAW UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. VC MILITARY REGION (MR) FIVE UNITS HAD TAKEN NO U.S. PRISONERS IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. AS A RESULT, A THREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN WAS INAUGURATED IN EARLY 1966 TO INDOCTRINATE ALL CADRES AND TROOPS IN THE VC POW POLICY, TO DISSEMINATE SLOGANS AND OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR CAPTURING U.S. TROOPS AND TO RECAPITULATE THE SUCCESSES OF THE VARIOUS UNITS IN CAPTURING U.S. FORCES.)

2. VC GENERAL HEADQUARTERS DOCUMENTS WHICH DEALT WITH

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POLICY TOWARD U.S. POW'S MADE THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS IN ASSESSING THE POSITION OF U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN): (1) WHEN U.S. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY AID TO SVN FAILED TO PRODUCE RESULTS, THE U.S. WAS FORCED TO SHOW ITS TRUE COLONIALIST INTENTIONS BY SENDING TROOPS TO SVN AND BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM (NVN), AN ACTION WHICH PROVES THAT THEY ARE AGGRESSORS AND WHICH WILL EARN THEM THE CONDEMNATION OF ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD. (2) INCREASED U.S. TROOP STRENGTH PROVIDES MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAPTURING AND KIDNAPPING AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND FOR CARRYING OUT PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AIMED AT ENCOURAGING U.S. FORCES TO DEFEY ORDERS AND TO SUPPORT THE VC REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE, BECAUSE THE U.S. TROOPS, PARTICULARLY OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH WELL TRAINED, ARE AFRAID OF THE HARDSHIPS OF WAR. (3) MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN ARE DRAFTEES FROM THE WORKING CLASS WHO HAVE BEEN DELUDED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTO THINKING THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING TO DEFEND THE FREE WORLD. THE TASK OF THE VC IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THE U.S. FORCES ARE FAR FROM HOME AND ENGAGED IN A DIFFICULT GUERRILLA WAR, BY WINNING THEM OVER, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT CAPTIVES, BY MAKING THEM AWARE OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THEIR MISSION IN VIETNAM, THEREBY SOWING

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DISUNITY IN THEIR RANKS.

3. THERE IS A THREEFOLD PURPOSE IN TAKING U.S. PRISONERS: THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES; THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THROUGH RADIO BROADCASTS AND INTERVIEWS PUBLISHED IN THE NEUTRALIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST PRESS; THEY CAN BE USED POLITICALLY TO FURTHER THE CAUSE OF COMMUNISM BEYOND THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF VIETNAM BY PROPAGANDIZING THEM, BRAIN WASHING THEM, AND CONVERTING THEM INTO COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST CADRES WHO WILL WORK ACTIVELY FOR THE PARTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

4. THE VC ALSO WANT TO TAKE A LARGE NUMBER OF CAPTIVES IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CALL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF POW'S. DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, MR FIVE HAS CAPTURED NO U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS ENGAGEMENTS. THEREFORE DURING AN MR FIVE CELEBRATION HELD IN EARLY 1966 IN THE JUNGLE AREA OF SON HA DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, FIELD GRADE POLITICAL OFFICER MAJOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN AND DEPUTY FIELD GRADE POLITICAL OFFICER SENIOR COLONEL TRINH CALLED ON ALL UNITS TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF PARTY AND NVN GOVERNMENT

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POLICY ON POW'S AND TO EXECUTE IT CORRECTLY. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN SEVERE PUNISHMENT. COLONEL TRINH THEN INAGURATED A THREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN BY PRESENTING A TYPICAL VC UNIT WITH A "SYMBOLIC" ROPE FOR TYING UP PRISONERS.

5. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN CONSISTED OF AN INTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION OF ALL CADRES AND TROOPS ON THE POW POLICY WHICH HAD BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE THE TIME OF THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH, BUT WHICH HAD NOT ALWAYS BEEN CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY. THIS PHASE, WHICH LASTED THREE MONTHS, FROM MARCH THROUGH MAY, WAS FIRST ORGANIZED BY THE PARTY COMMITTEES AT DIVISION, REGIMENT, AND BATTALION LEVELS AND THEN NON-PARTY MEMBERS WERE SUBJECTED TO INDOCTRINATION. THE ADVANTAGES OF TAKING LIVE PRISONERS WAS STRESSED, AND THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE GIVEN FOR VC CADRES AND SOLDIERS FAILURE TO DO SO IN THE PAST: THE VC WERE NOT AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING POW'S; THEY WANTED TO AVENGE THEIR CAMRADES BY SLAUGHTERING THE ENEMY; THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES AND HARDSHIPS INVOLVED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERS FROM THE UNIT TO THE COMMAND POST; AND WHEN A UNIT WAS SURROUNDED OR HAD SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES PRISONERS WERE KILLED TO MAKE WITHDRAWAL EASIER.

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(classification)

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6. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN, WHICH STARTED IN JUNE 1966 AND WAS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE THROUGH JANUARY 1967, WAS ENTITLED "EMULATION FOR CAPTURING AMERICANS". SLOGANS SUCH AS "A LIVE POW IS EQUAL TO TEN DEAD AMERICAN AGGRESSORS" WERE DISSEMINATED AND OPERATIONAL PLANS BASED ON THESE SLOGANS WERE FORMULATED. ALL SOLDIERS AND CADRES HAD TO OBTAIN ROPES, AND PRIOR TO AN OPERATION THE LEADERS CHECKED TO MAKE SURE THE TROOPS HAD THEM. THOSE WHO DID NOT HAVE ROPES WERE SEVERELY PUNISHED. THE VC WERE ORDERED TO ENGAGE IN CLOSE COMBAT IN ORDER TO TAKE U.S. PRISONERS. THEY WERE ALSO ORDERED TO TREAT U.S. POW'S WELL, TO GIVE THEM ENOUGH TO EAT, TO BEHAVE POLITELY, AND TO ATTEMPT TO PROPAGANDIZE THEM. POW'S WERE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMAND POST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, EVEN IF THE PRISONER HAD TO BE CARRIED. UPON WITHDRAWING WHEN SURROUNDED BY THE ENEMY, POW'S, WOUNDED, AND DEAD SHOULD BE EVACUATED FIRST, THEN WEAPONS AND FINALLY THE UNIT.

7. THE THIRD PHASE, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN EARLY 1967, WAS TO BE A RECAPITULATION OF SUCCESSES AND CELEBRATIONS

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WERE TO BE HELD TO CONGRATULATE AND REWARD OUTSTANDING UNITS.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV
7TH AIR FORCE DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINC PAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

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[REDACTED] (classification) (dissem controls)

IN 28753

REF ID: A315/33178-66

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[REDACTED]

IN AUGUST, THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FOR FOREIGNERS IN HANOI. IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER MEAT, RICE, SUGAR, MATCHES, AND SOAP WERE RATIONED. THE SUPPLY OF RICE AND SUGAR WAS SUFFICIENT FOR PEOPLE TO OBTAIN THEIR QUOTAS, BUT IN MID-SEPTEMBER SOME PEOPLE SAID THEY WERE NOT GETTING THEIR QUOTAS OF MEAT. THE PEOPLE WERE CONVINCED THAT HANOI WOULD BE BOMBED, BUT THEY REMAINED CALM. THERE WAS LITTLE POLICE CONTROL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, AND SOVIET PERSONNEL WERE FREE TO LEAVE HANOI AS THEY WISHED. THE AI HO AREA ACROSS THE RED RIVER FROM HANOI APPEARED TO BE A MILITARY TRAINING AREA, AND ANOTHER RESTRICTED AREA IN THE O YEN PHU SECTION NORTH OF THE HO TRUC BACH LAKE WAS FREQUENTED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.)

2. IN AN AREA OF HANOI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THERE WAS A LARGE WALLED-IN ESTABLISHMENT WITH THREE STRANDS OF ELECTRIFIED WIRE WITH NEW LOOKING INSULATORS ON TOP OF THE WALLS. THE WALLS WERE WHITE, FRESHLY PAINTED AND LIGHTED ALL NIGHT. THE ENTRANCE WAS GUARDED BY TWO UNIFORMED VIETNAMESE. THE AREA WAS VERY QUIET. ONCE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1966 PEOPLE INSIDE THE WALLS WERE SPEAKING WHAT SEEMED TO BE ENGLISH. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE IN HANOI THEY WERE PROBABLY IN THIS LOCATION. [REDACTED] RIGHT AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS OF OIL DEPOTS OUTSIDE HANOI A PILOT CAPTURED IN THE ATTACK WAS TAKEN ALONG THE STREET FROM THE 85 AREA TO THE 131 AREA BY A RAILROAD TRACKS AND THEN TO A LOCATION IN THE AREA OF THE INTERNATIONAL [REDACTED]

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CONTROL COMMISSION OFFICE IN THE 170 AREA. HE WAS THEN TAKEN
BACK ALONG THE SAME STREET. [REDACTED] COMMENT: TDCSDB-315/
02978-66 REPORTED THAT [REDACTED]
BELIEVED THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE LOCATED IN THE HANOI CITY
JAIL IN A BLOCK BOUNDED BY DAI LO HAI BA TRUNG, HANG BONG, PHO
HOA LO, AND PHO HO QUAN SU, IDENTIFIED AS COORDINATE WJ-884288 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT LOCATION AND THE ONE
REPORTED HERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IDENTICAL.)

9. AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS MIG-17'S FLEW OVER HANOI
DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ALMOST DAILY. THE PLANES WENT THROUGH
MANEUVERS THERE, DIVING AND BANKING SEVERAL THOUSAND FEET UP.
THEY STAYED UP FOR A SHORT TIME, THEN DISAPPEARED. ONCE IN
SEPTEMBER MIG-21'S FLEW OVER HANOI. ON A SUNDAY IN SEPTEMBER AN
F4TUDHIN-14 WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE MARKINGS LANDED IN THE [REDACTED] AREA.

4/5. RIGHT AFTER THE BOMBINGS THE SHOPS IN THE HO HOAN KIEN
LAKE AREA [REDACTED] WERE SHUTTERED UP AND THE AREA DESERTED IN THE
DAYTIME. THE PEOPLE WERE SENT TO WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING
THE DAY BUT REMAINED HOME AT NIGHT. AS OF THE END OF AUGUST, HOWEVER,

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THE SHOPS HAD REOPENED, AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL HOURS A DAY. THE STATE STORE [REDACTED] NEAR A HOSPITAL WAS OPEN MORNINGS FROM 0600 HOURS TO 0800 HOURS. THERE WERE NO REFUGEE CAMPS IN HANOI NOR EVIDENCE OF SHANTIES OR TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOUSING. NO SCHOOLS WERE OPEN IN HANOI. CHILDREN WHO LIVED IN HANOI ATTENDED SCHOOLS IN THE SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE.

5. FACTORIES THROUGHOUT HANOI WORKED A FULL SCHEDULE. THE FACTORY TWO BLOCKS FROM THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR [REDACTED] WHICH SEEMED TO BE A STATIONERY FACTORY, WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK.

6. THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF GASOLINE AND OIL SUPPLIES FOR FOREIGNERS IN HANOI AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS. THEY COULD BE PURCHASED FREELY AT ONE OF THREE STATE OUTLETS. OIL TANKS WERE BEING REPAIRED IN THE WAREHOUSE AREA ALONG THE RED RIVER [REDACTED] WHEN THE WELDING, SURFACING, AND PAINTING WERE COMPLETED, THE TANKS WERE MOVED OUT FROM THIS AREA BY TRUCK.

7. SINCE JUST BEFORE DECEMBER 1965 EACH PERSON HAD BEEN ALLOWED A RATION OF 300 GRAMS OF MEAT A MONTH. SOME VIETNAMESE SAID IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1966 THAT THEY WERE NOT GETTING THEIR QUOTA. RICE WAS RATIONED BUT WAS IN SUFFICIENT SUPPLY. HOWEVER, WHEAT AND RICE BREAD WERE BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR THE RICE RATION IN CERTAIN AREAS OF HANOI. MATCHES WERE RATIONED AS OF LATE OCTOBER 1966. TWO BOXES PER PERSON WERE ISSUED TO LAST UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. THE RATIONING OF SOAP ALSO BEGAN IN LATE

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
OCCUPATION, WITH ONE BAR OF SCRUBBING SOAP PER ADULT FOR THREE MONTHS. ONLY CHILDREN UNDER ONE YEAR WERE PERMITTED TOILET SOAP AND THIS WAS RATIONED AT THE SAME RATE. SUGAR WAS RATIONED, BUT PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO GET THEIR QUOTAS.

8. TRUCK CONVOYS, OFTEN OF 12 OR MORE TRUCKS, PARKED ALONG THE RED RIVER [REDACTED] THE TRUCKS APPEARED TO BE CZECHOSLOVAK MANUFACTURE. THE DRIVERS SLEPT IN THE CABS, POSSIBLY AWAITING NIGHTFALL, AS THE SOUND OF TRUCKS MOVING OUT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE COULD BE HEARD AT NIGHT. THERE WERE MORE TRUCKS IN RECENT WEEKS IN HANOI THAN THERE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY.

9. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE POLICE CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN HANOI ITSELF. POLICE AT CHECKPOINTS AT THE BASE OF THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE ON THE HANOI SIDE SEEMED MOST CONCERNED WITH REGULATING TRAFFIC. VIETNAMESE WERE OFTEN NOT CHECKED, AND ONLY THOSE WITH LARGE CARTS WHICH MIGHT IMPEDE TRAFFIC ON THE BRIDGE WERE HELD UP. OTHER CHECKPOINTS WERE AT THE CROSSROADS AT ANA YU SO, AT PHUONG LEAT [REDACTED] AND AT THE CROSSROAD [REDACTED] BETWEEN THE PARK AND THE CEMETERY. (U)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

10. JUDGING FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE WORKING FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND SHOP OWNERS IN THE HO MOAN KIEN LAKE AREA, IT APPEARED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE CONVINCED HANOI WOULD BE BOMBED.

(Please continue)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

but they took the prospect of bombing calmly, as they did stories of bombing in the countryside. There were many single-person semi-concrete bomb shelters being constructed on the streets all over Hanoi. They were about two feet in diameter and five feet high with a concrete lid. When finished they were buried in the ground.

[REDACTED]

When

questioned, some Vietnamese appeared to be unclear as to why North Vietnam was fighting. One bourgeois Vietnamese functionary made the comment in early 1966 that soldiers who went to South Vietnam never came back and were never heard from again. There were no war veterans or wounded in evidence in Hanoi.

[REDACTED]

Worked for the French mission as an administrative officer said that when he had taken a group of French to Haiphong just after the 29 June bombings he observed that many of the bridges had been destroyed and planks used to construct single-lane wooden bridges over which trucks could pass.

11. The Ai Mo area on the other side of the Red River from Hanoi appeared to be used as a military training area. Troops walked in groups in this area with guns and packs on their backs. Another restricted area was in the O Yen Phu section just north of the Ho Truc Bach Lake. This was surrounded by a wall and there was a sign

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "NO ENTRY". SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL FREQUENTED THE AREA.

[REDACTED] COMMENT. THE AREA COULD HAVE BEEN A LOCAL PRISON.)

12. A NUMBER OF SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL WERE CONCENTRATED

IN [REDACTED] HANOI NEAR BA DINH SQUARE. THERE WAS NO NOTICEABLE INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL IN RECENT MONTHS. THE SOVIETS HAD NO CHECKPOINT RESTRICTIONS AND WERE FREE TO LEAVE HANOI AS THEY WISHED. BUSLOADS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL OFTEN WENT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE AND ALONG THE ROAD TOWARD THE AIRPORT DURING THE DAYTIME.

13. [REDACTED] HAD SEEN HO CHI MINH SOMETIME IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS IN OCTOBER.

14. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE ARMY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC USMACV-SA GON 7TH AIR FORCE (SAIGON) [REDACTED]

RAND
APR 26 1967
W14292
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : NVN Policy Toward US
Prisoners

DATE OF REPORT: 24/3/67

DATE OF INFO : 1965 - 1966

NO. OF PAGES: 2

DATE AND PLACE : 30 January 1967 (P)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

REF:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

S U M M A R Y

All captured US personnel were taken to regiment headquarters, because only regimental cadres had the authority to interrogate US captives. The capturing unit had full responsibility for the lives of US personnel until they were delivered to a higher authority. Generally, captives did not remain for a long time with a battalion or regiment. Eventually all POWs, were taken to HANOI, both for their own safety and so that they could get enough food. Source heard that the prisoners were never beaten and generally received good treatment. While Source was being detained, he met other VC prisoners who claimed that a US pilot, a former POW, had said that NVN had a good POW policy and that some US captives did not want to leave NVN.

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ATTACHMENTS:

None

1.3(a)(4)

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APR 11 1967

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Date September 1993

RND 927661-20

1. According to NVN policy for the treatment of POWs, all captured US personnel had to be taken to regimental headquarters. Only regimental cadres had the authority to interrogate US captives. The unit which captured US personnel had full responsibility for their lives from the time they were captured until they were delivered to a superior authority. The unit concerned usually assigned LABOR YOUTH GROUP members to accompany the captives and to prevent the people, militia or guerrillas from approaching them, because in certain areas the people would beat the AMERICANS. The command sections of battalions and regiments took care of feeding US captives. Usually, AMERICANS were fed with canned food seized in battle. Generally, the captives did not remain for a long time with a battalion or regiment. Source had heard that all US POWs were eventually taken to HANOI, so that they could have enough food and to ensure their safety. If the AMERICANS were captured in SVN, they had to go part of the way on foot, but if captured in NVN, they could go to HANOI by train or truck.
2. Source heard that US pilots, as well as other POWs, received good treatment and were never beaten. They might be taught the VIETNAMESE language and have political discussions, if they wished. They had a special diet, clean living quarters, and a restricted recreational area. Source commented that while he was being detained in PLEIKU Province, SVN, he met some VC prisoners who knew a US pilot who had been picked up in QUANG BINH Province, NVN and later released. The pilot told the VC prisoners that NVN had a good POW policy and that some US captives did not want to leave NVN and seemed very much attached to HANOI.

RAND

MAY 4 1967

W14342

WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
 SUBJECT : Exhibition of US POWs
 DATE OF INFO : September 1964
 DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION : 21 March 1967 (M - E)
 : SAIGON, Vietnam

DATE OF REPORT: 30/3/67

NO. OF PAGES: 2

REF:

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SOURCE:

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S U M M A R Y

On 2 September 1964, Source observed an exhibition of two US POWs. The exhibition was called "The 5 August Exhibition."

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None

APR 19 1967

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NND 927661-24

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Date

September 1993

1. On 2 September 1964, Source saw two captured US pilots at an exhibition in HANOI, NVN. The exhibition was called "The 5 August Exhibition", because the pilots had been shot down on that day.
2. The exhibition was held in a building in UNIFICATION Park, VAN HO Area (near BAY MAU Lake), HANOI. The pilots, dressed in white, were seated in one room; their uniforms, head gear, identification cards, and fragments of their aircraft were displayed in another room. They both appeared to be young, strong, and fat. Their hair was brown. Source could not remember their names.

INFO: J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5
DIA-15 CSA-1 CSAF-5 CNO-2 CMC-3 CJCS-1 FILE-1(46)

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FOR MCCC/HC
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081422Z CITE TDCS -314/05071-67

DIST 8 APRIL 1967

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 1 FEBRUARY 1967

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SOUPHANOUVONG TO THREE AMERICANS HELD IN
A CAVE ON THE HOUEI VONG IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (8 APRIL 1967)

SOURCE:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 1972

1. ON 1 FEBRUARY 1967 [REDACTED] ATTENDED A CEREMONY HELD
TO WELCOME SOUPHANOUVONG WHO HAD COME TO VISIT THE THREE AMERICAN
PRISONERS HELD IN A CAVE NEAR KANG LIT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: -

(NOT YET RECEIVED)

[REDACTED] DATED 5 APRIL 1967, (NOT DISSEMINATED ELECTRICALLY)
BECAUSE IT CONTAINED A MAP OF THE AREA, REPORTED THREE
AMERICAN PILOTS IN A CAVE NEAR THE KANG LIT WATERFALL ON THE
HOUEI VONG BETWEEN BAN KANG NONG 374475 AND DANE PHAO
(VH 369540). THE PILOTS HAD BEEN MOVED THERE FROM SAN NAKAY.

DNF-81

7-100-04
81 (S-47101/DB-VH)

TEU (VH 1955) IN MARCH 1966. IN [REDACTED] THE SOURCE
(TDCS-314/16404-66)
CORRECTED HIS EARLIER REPORT, DISSEMINATED AS [REDACTED] / THAT
THERE WERE TWO PILOTS IMPRISONED NEAR THE HOUET VONG.) THE
CEREMONY WAS HELD OUTSIDE OF THE CAVE WHERE THE AMERICANS
WERE IMPRISONED. [REDACTED] ALONG WITH SOME VILLAGERS, HAD BEEN
INVITED TO MEET THE AMERICANS.

2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS SMALL,
ABOUT THE SIZE OF A LAO. THE SECOND WAS BALD OR BALDING, AND
THE THIRD HAD A CREW CUT AND HAIRY ARMS AND CHEST. [REDACTED]
COULD NOT REMEMBER ANY NAMES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] COULD
NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF THE AMERICANS IN PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN HIM.)

3. [REDACTED] SAID THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE HAPPY AND CHEERFUL
AND IN GOOD HEALTH. THEY WERE NOT TIED OR HANDCUFFED. THEY
JOKED AND SMILED WHEN THEY TALKED WITH SOUPHANOUVONG. ONE
OF THEM TAPPED [REDACTED] ON THE BACK AND SHOOK HIS HAND.

4. [REDACTED] COUNTED 32 KHA GUARDS SURROUNDING THE AMERICANS.
HE COMMENTED THAT THERE ARE USUALLY MANY PL TROOPS IN THE AREA
AND THAT SOME HAVE VEHICLES. THE ROAD TO THE PRISON IS ROUGH
AND PASSES THROUGH WOODS.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR
[REDACTED]

40551

TDCS -314/05071-67

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

(signature)

(date and initials)

FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

INFO: J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 V...A-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5
DIA-15 CSA-1 CSAF-5 CNO-2 CMC-3 FILE-1(45)

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DATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC SECDEF JCSC ARMY NAVY AIR

USIA

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13 2120Z

CITE TDCS - 314/05325-67

DIST 13 APRIL 1967

15451

COUNTRY: LAOS

DATE: MAY 1965

SUBJECT: TWO AMERICAN PILOTS HELD CAPTIVE IN KHANG KHAY, XIENG
KHOUANG PROVINCE, IN MAY 1965

Q:

SOURCE:

1. IN MAY 1965

THE HOME OF GENERAL SINGKAPO. TWO AMERICAN
PILOTS IN FLIGHT SUITS WITH THE INSIGNIA OF RANK REMOVED WERE
BEING HELD UNDER ARMED GUARD IN THE GENERAL'S HOUSE. THEY WERE
NOT HANDCUFFED OR LOCKED UP.

THE PILOTS WERE
QUIET AND LOOKED WORRIED. ONE WAS TALL AND BALDING. THE OTHER,
ALSO WAS ALSO TALL, HAD A HEAVY BUILD AND A ROUND FACE.

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC IECOLF (C) ARMY NAVY AIR

USIA

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

13 2120Z

CITE TDCS - 314/05325-67

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[REDACTED] THE HOME OF GENERAL SINGKAPO. TWO AMERICAN
PILOTS IN FLIGHT SUITS WITH THE INSIGNIA OF RANK REMOVED WERE
BEING HELD UNDER ARMED GUARD IN THE GENERAL'S HOUSE. THEY WERE
NOT HANDCUFFED OR LOCKED UP. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PILOTS WERE
QUIET AND LOOKED WORRIED. ONE WAS TALL AND BALDING. THE OTHER,
ALSO WAS ALSO TALL, HAD A HEAVY BUILD AND A ROUND FACE.
[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DateMAY 21
1978

IN 44576

TDCS - 314/05325-67

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] COULD NOT IDENTIFY EITHER OF
THE PILOTS IN PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN HIM.)

[REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
INCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

RAND

JUN 5 1967
W14603
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
SUBJECT : QUANG TIN Provisional Military
Proselyting Section and VC
POW Camps
DATE OF INFO : 13 January - October 1966
DATE AND PLACE : 12 February 1967 (R)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

DATE OF REPORT: 21/4/67 1.3(a)(4)

NO. OF PAGES: 5

REF:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY

Source served as an Adjutant of the POW camp, under the jurisdiction of the Military Proselyting Section, in QUANG TIN Province, SVN. The Military Proselyting Section covered the three main elements of propaganda, penetration and POW camps. Capturing POWs was the task of battlefield agencies comprised of operation units and village guerrilla troops. They surrendered them to the district agency who either kept them or passed them to the province POW camps. Prisoners were transferred from lower to higher agencies. Province POW camps were either central line camps or rear base camps.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

None

1.3(a)(4)

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Postal Registry No. 35053 MAY 28 1967

Approved for Release
Date September 1993
NND 927661-47

1.3(a)(4)

At the central line camps, the prisoners and surrenderers from local or battle areas were classified and then sent to a provincial or regional POW rear base camps. At the rear base camp, prisoners were detained while being indoctrinated prior to their release. Source gave some details regarding the rations and billeting of rear base camp personnel. Source did not know the interrogation technique used on POWs. Prisoners were the responsibility of the capturing agency and were strictly accounted for.

MAP REFERENCES:

SGIF Series L605, Sheet 137E, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 6

SGIF Series L605, Sheet 137W, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 6

SGIF Series L605, Sheet 143W, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 2

1. During the period 13 January to October 1966 Source was an adjutant of the VC prisoner of war (POW) camp under the jurisdiction of the Military Proselyting Section in QUANG TIN Provincial Committee, called CUU LONG, QUANG TIN Province, SVN, under the leadership of HAI. The organization structure of the Proselyting Section was as follows: Chief, NGUYEN HIEN; Deputy Chief, NGUYEN NAM; Administrative Staff, THANH; and Printing Staff, SI. There were five or six additional personnel.
2. The Military Proselyting Section covered three main elements: propaganda, penetration, and POW camps. The propaganda element (composition unknown) shared the office with the Military Proselyting Section. Its responsibility was to produce leaflets and documents to indoctrinate people in liberated areas. Source did not know the cadre organization or activities of the penetration element.
3. The chief of the POW element was NGUYEN NAM (concurrently Chief of the Military Proselyting Section). This element established two kinds of POW camps: central line camp and rear base camp. The cadre organization the central line camp was not known.
4. The central line camp consisted of many mobile bases established near battlefields during the operations. These mobile bases were in charge of receiving prisoners and surrenderers from local or battle area. After classification (non-commissioned, commissioned, US or Allied troops, civilians, lightly wounded, suspects) prisoners and surrenderers would be sent to the provincial or regional POW rear base camps.
5. The rear base camp was located in a secure area. Here captured non-commissioned officers and soldiers were detained while being indoctrinated prior to their release. One rear base camp was built at coordinates AS 910910 in a dense mountainous area about a day's walk southwest of HAU DUC District (TRA MY) and about 10 kilometers, southwest of BA Mountain (coordinates BS 040910).
6. The POW element was organized as follows:
 - A. Board of Directors
 - (1) Director : NGUYEN DAO
 - (2) Deputy Director : LE BA CONG
 - (3) Adjutant : ☐

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(4) Political Instructor : NGUYEN TRUNG

(5) First Aid agent : ANH

B. Interior Guard Squad

(1) Squad leader : BINH

(2) Strength : nine personnel (HONG, THANH, HANH,...)

(3) Weapons : nine Soviet modified rifles

(4) Task : protect installations and maintain security

7. The quartering location for the Military Proselyting Section was KY LONG Village, TAM KY District, QUANG TIN Province. Each local family housed one or two personnel. Source arrived there in January 1966. However, he was unable to observe the VC installations as entries and exits to hamlets were restricted. In August 1966, this section moved to PHUOC CAM Village, about 100 meters from the route leading to TAM KY. There they were also dispersed among the populace.
8. One rear base camp was built at coordinates AS 910910 in a dense forest mountain area about a day's walk southwest of the HAU DUC District (TRA MY) about 10 kilometers southwest of BA Mountain (coordinates BS 040910). The rear base camp consisted of two 40 x 8 meters thatch buildings, about ten meters apart which accommodated 40 to 50 persons. In addition, there were two mess halls, one for POWs and the other for the Board of Directors. One building provided lodging for the guards. There was one reference room and one kitchen.
9. The rear base camp consisted of two 40 x 8 meter thatch buildings, about ten meters apart, which accommodated 40 to 50 persons. In addition, there were two mess halls, one for POWs and the other for the Board of Directors. One building provided lodging for the guards. These buildings were about 10 to 50 meters apart and were surrounded by a bamboo fence and protected by the guard unit.
10. The monthly ration for rear base personnel consisted of 15 kilos of rice, three kilos of sweet potato and 60 SVN piasters for food. The cadres and personnel ate together. The meals consisted of cooked rice and salted fish only, prepared by the guard section. The soldiers had to supplement their food by gathering mustard, banana buds and pumpkins. Sometimes, they went fishing with nets or grenades. They seldom had pork. Cadres and soldiers who had money could buy food in the lowland.
11. Each member of the unit received a monthly allowance of 20 SVN piasters. The Director received 40 SVN piasters per month. Money was given by the Military Proselyting Section to the Director who turned it over to the Adjutant to be doled to personnel.
12. Cadres and soldiers who had been neither NVN regular troops nor repatriates were issued yearly one suit of black peasant's pyjama or khaki uniform, one pair of shorts, one belt for containing rice, one blanket, one piece of nylon for use as raincoat, one rucksack (every third year) and one canteen. Infiltrators and repatriates had to use the clothing and equipment brought in from NVN.
13. Most of the unit members suffered from malnutrition and all had malaria.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

Medicines were available for malaria, dysentery, influenza and coughs. Antibiotics were used in treating wounds. Infiltrators brought enough tonics to last two years. If they became seriously ill, they were given shots. Depending on the seriousness of their illness, individuals were entitled to two additional piasters to purchase supplementary food.

14. From January to March 1966, the POW camp was involved in food and animal production. Rice and ten thousand manioc trees were cultivated. A 3,600 square meter paddyfield yielded about 400 kilos of rice per harvest. The cultivated area was located on a mountain slope approximately two kilometers south of the barracks. They raised four pigs and 30 chickens. The cadres and soldiers also participated in repairing barracks, digging trenches and carrying supplies.
15. In March 1966, Source and two comrades named HA NAM and THANH were transferred to the Military Proselyting Section and assigned to production in KY SON Village, TAM KY District, QUANG TIN Province. After getting two buffaloes from the Military Proselyting Section, they cultivated about 10,000 square meters of paddyfield which had been abandoned by the local people. They cultivated 10,000 manioc trees and 720 square meters of sweet potatoes on the mountainside. In August 1966, before harvest time, Source went on home leave to BINH DINH Province, where he was captured on 7 October 1966.
16. Although Source was responsible for managing the POW camp he had not received instruction regarding POW transfers. His comrades told him several principles. POWs must be transferred from lower to upper agencies. Capturing POWs was the task of the battlefield agency which was comprised of operation units and village guerrilla troops. The battlefield agency surrendered them to the district agency (Military Proselyting Section). After classifying the POWs, the district agency would either transfer or keep them. The district POW camp was reserved for detaining regional and militia troops in the district. The provincial POW camps were either central line camps or rear base camps. The Regional Agency received the important prisoners, such as SVN non-commissioned or commissioned officers and US and allied troops. Source did not know they would be treated there. He was told that they would be liberated after a rather long indoctrination.
17. Each agency was required to have some personnel in charge of escorting prisoners. Prisoners traveled by foot to the receiving agency. The prisoners were neither handcuffed nor blindfolded during the journey.
18. The first responsibility of the agencies concerned was to put the frightened and confused prisoners at ease by explaining the VC line and policy. The prisoners must be told that after a period of necessary indoctrination they would be liberated. The belongings of POWs must be carefully kept and recorded. A receipt listing the amount of money and jewels was written clearly and the owner's signature obtained. If the prisoners were transferred, their belongings would be brought along with them. If they were liberated, their belongings would have to be given back to them.
19. All POWs were interrogated on the spot by the agencies in charge of capturing them. (Source did not know whether or not they later would be interrogated by the other agencies). Source learned that the interrogators paid the most attention to the biographics and occupations of prisoners. Source did not know the interrogation technique.
20. The agency capturing the prisoners had to provide food within one or two days. If prisoners were detained in a district over three days, the district agency would make a report to the province to claim expenses. The

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

general expenses for POWs in all of the province were given by the provincial Committee.

21. The monthly ration of each POW or surrenderer included 15 kilos of rice; a supplement of 3 kilos of sweet potato and 60 SVN piasters for food (fish sauce, salt and mustard).

3

1.3(a)(4)

RAND

JUN 12 1967
W14657
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : Captured US POW

DATE OF INFO : 27 December 1966

DATE OF REPORT: 16/5/67

DATE AND PLACE : 11 May 1967 (H - N)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

NO. OF PAGES : 2

REFERENCES : None

SOURCE: []

1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY

Following a 27 December 1966 engagement near XUAN SON Village, HOAI AN District, BINH DINH Province, SVN, an American First Air Cavalry Division private was captured by Battalion 8 and interrogated. Source never saw the American. He heard that the prisoner claimed he had come to visit the Vietnamese people but had not come to fight them. He had been in SVN six months before his capture.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

1.3(a)(4) None

JUN 2 1967

Postal Registry No. 36420

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Approved for Release
Date September 1993

NND 927661-66

1.3(a)(4)

1. Following a 27 December 1966 engagement near XUAN SON Village, HOAI AN District, BINH DINH Province, SVN, an American First Air Cavalry Division infantryman was captured by VC Battalion 8. He was later interrogated at the battalion by the English-speaking assistant radio platoon leader, Senior Sergeant NGUYEN AN MICH. It was not known where the American was taken and detained.
2. Source never saw the American but heard that he was a private, about 18 years old, Caucasian, was tall and had a large build. The American stated that he had completed a US 12th Grade formal education and was single. He had come to SVN to travel and to visit the Vietnamese people, but had not come to fight them. The American said he had been in SVN for six months before his capture.

1.3(a)(4)

3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC MC ISSUED JCR ARMY NAVY AIRS CIA/DMCC NIC NSA OCA SDO
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CITE TDCSDB-315/01734-67

240946Z

DIST 24 MAY 1967

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 20 AND 22 APRIL 1967

SUBJECT: DEATH OF AMERICAN FLIER IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE AND
USE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. [REDACTED], A RICE FARMER [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO HAD BEEN A PATHET LAO

OFFICER UNTIL ABOUT 1966, TOLD HIM THAT ON 20 APRIL 1967 ONE OF
THREE AMERICANS BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN A CAVE AT KANG LIT IN THE
VICINITY OF VH 366531 HAD DIED. HE KNEW NO DETAILS REGARDING THE
PRISONER'S DEATH. [REDACTED] COMMENT [REDACTED]

#150

Loos

Approved for Release
DATE 26 OCT 1978

[REDACTED]
(classification) (return controls)
[REDACTED]
*TDCS-314/06254-67 AND TDCS-314/05071-67

1 Mi. 5 of L-1 2. ON 22 APRIL THE OTHER TWO AMERICANS WERE TAKEN TO BAN NAKAY IEU (VH 192552) TO BROADCAST FOR THE PATHET LAO RADIO. IN

THE PAST THE THREE CAPTIVES USUALLY MADE THE TRIP EVERY OTHER MONTH. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WHILE THE PRISONERS MAY HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO DETAILED QUESTIONING, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY MADE LIVE BROADCASTS SINCE NONE IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN MADE. BROADCASTS HOWEVER COULD HAVE BEEN TAPED FOR FUTURE USE. THE TRIPS USUALLY TOOK TEN DAYS. ONE OF THE PILOTS WAS TALL AND THIN AND APPARENTLY SPOKE LAO. ?

3. ON 22 APRIL MASTER SERGEANT CHINGAN, THE CHIEF OF THE PATHET LAO GUARDS DETAINED TO THE AMERICAN PRISONERS, WAS TRANSFERRED TO BAN NAKAY IEU BECAUSE HE APPARENTLY FAILED TO NOTIFY THE PROPER AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERING THAT ONE OF THE PILOTS WAS ILL. THE TWO AMERICANS, WHO ARRIVED AT CHINGAN'S HOUSE EARLY ON 22 APRIL ACCOMPANIED HIM TO BAN NAKAY IEU IN ONE VEHICLE THAT EVENING. KHAMBAI, A PATHET LAO OFFICER, ARRIVED THE SAME DAY TO REPLACE CHINGAN. Handling [unclear]

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Document # 119c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN- 85863

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CITE

DIST 9 JUNE 1967

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE MAY 1967

SUBJECT MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS IN HANOI 9 22 57Z

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

11 JAN 1993

ACD

SOURCE

FIELD NO.

1.3(a)(4)

1. SUMMARY.

FIVE ACTIVE UNDERGROUND POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE CITY AND IN THE SUBURBS. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE THE CITY. ALSO, MAJOR INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUTSIDE THE CITY, WHILE SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF THE CITY. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED REGARDING THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER.

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POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI, THREE OF WHICH ARE LOCATED WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS AND THE OTHER TWO ON THE OUTSKIRTS. [REDACTED] ONE OF THE POWER STATIONS IS LOCATED NEXT TO THE INDIAN CONSULATE GENERAL ON LE THAN KIET. IT IS DESCRIBED AS A [REDACTED]

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Classification.

(Steam controls)

1.3(e)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

RELATIVELY SMALL SOLID CONCRETE BUILDING WITH MANY ELECTRIC CABLES EMANATING FROM IT AND WITH THE WORKS LOCATED UNDERGROUND. THERE IS A LARGE POWER PLANT UNDERNEATH THE MAIN POWER STATION WHICH APPARENTLY HAS NOT BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED. THERE HAS BEEN NO RATIONING OF ELECTRICITY. AUTHORITIES HAVE URGED ALL RESIDENTS INCLUDING THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY TO CUT DOWN ON THE USE OF AIR CONDITIONERS AND OTHER ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES. HOWEVER, NO EFFORT HAS BEEN EXERTED TO ENFORCE THIS EDICT AND THE PLEAS HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED BY RESIDENTS. APART FROM THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE 19 AND 20 MAY BOMBINGS, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SHORTAGE OF WATER IN HANOI.

3. DURING THE AIR RAIDS, THE WELL TRAINED POPULACE RESPOND TO THE AIR RAID ALARMS BY GOING TO THE AIR RAID SHELTERS QUICKLY IN A DISCIPLINED FASHION. A FEW REMAIN OUTSIDE BUT STILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE SHELTERS IN CASE OF AN ACTUAL RAID.

4. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED IN AREAS WITHIN AN EIGHT TO SIXTY KILOMETER RADIUS AROUND HANOI. ONLY THOSE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN SOME ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY OR ACTIVITY REMAIN IN TOWN. ALL SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND ARE NOW OPERATING IN SMALL GROUPS DISPERSED OUTSIDE OF HANOI. THE PEOPLE ARE NOT SENT TO ANY SPECIFIC RELOCATION SPOTS, BUT RATHER SEEK REFUGE WHEREVER THEY CAN. NO ONE LIVING OUTSIDE OF HANOI IS PERMITTED TO REFUSE SHELTER TO THEM. MANY WHO ARE SENT OUT OF HANOI RETURN, BUT THEY ARE SENT BACK ON BUSES. THERE ARE MANY SOVIET BUSES IN EVIDENCE BOTH IN HANOI AND IN THE ENVIRONS. THE HOURS OF OPERATION ARE FROM 0400 TO 0600 HOURS IN THE MORNING AND AFTER 1900 HOURS IN THE EVENING. MANY SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN PURPOSELY TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF HANOI IN ORDER TO AVOID THE BOMBING. MAJOR INDUSTRIES

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE OF HANOI BUT ACTUAL LOCATIONS ARE UNKNOWN. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS STILL LOCATED IN HANOI.

5. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS WANTED TO CONTROL THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE OBJECTED AND STATED THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME CONTROL AT THE USSR BORDER. AT THIS POINT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INTERVENED AND SAID THAT IF THE USSR AND CHINA WERE GOING TO DISAGREE OVER THIS, THEN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT CONTINUE THE WAR. THE AGREEMENT ATTAINED IS A COMPROMISE WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. [REDACTED] IN JANUARY THE SOVIETS PLANNED TO IMPORT FINNED MORTARS POSSIBLY 140MM WITH FIVE MILE RANGE WHICH ARE THE SAME TYPE WHICH WERE USED TO SHELL DANANG AIR BASE TWO MONTHS LATER.)

1.3(a)(4)

6. [REDACTED] AN UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN PILOT, SHOT DOWN IN A 24 MAY RAID, WAS DISPLAYED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE 25 MAY AT 0500 HOURS. WHEN HE SHOWED SOME RELUCTANCE TO BOW TO THE PRESS THREE TIMES, HE WAS CUFFED ON THE HEAD BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER UNTIL HE DID. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THIS TREATMENT RESEMBLED SOMEWHAT THE EXHIBITION OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RICHARD STRATTON [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE USMACV [REDACTED] CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

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* [REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

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STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
			DDI			Exo			USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)

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SECRET

21 19 40 Z

CITE

DIST 21 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DOI: AS OF 18 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: RAIDS OF THE SECOND WEEK OF JUNE CAUSE FURTHER DAMAGE
TO HANOI FACILITIES; FOREIGN LEGATIONS PREPARE
EVACUATION PLANS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1.

MAJOR AMERICAN RAIDS FROM THAI BASES AGAIN HIT ADDITIONAL
WATER AND ELECTRICAL FACILITIES IN THE CITY OF HANOI. AS A
RESULT, AS OF 18 JUNE THE WATER SUPPLY SITUATION IN HANOI HAD
"DETERIORATED" GREATLY. WATER WAS IRREGULAR IN SUPPLY AND WAS
OFTEN NOT OF PROPER PURITY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)~~SECRET~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

AN AUXILLARY WATER SUPPLY UNIT HAD BEEN HIT AS WELL AS A MAIN PUMPING STATION AND REPAIRS WERE NOT PERFECTLY EFFECTED. COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS RESULTED FROM THE 9-10 JUNE RAIDS OR A SUBSEQUENT RAID THE NEXT WEEK).

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

2. ELECTRICITY WAS A CONDITION ALMOST AS BAD, WITH RATIONING STILL IN EFFECT AND POWER BREAKDOWNS OCCURRING. AN ELECTRICAL PLANT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI WAS REPORTEDLY BADLY DAMAGED SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JUNE.

3. THE HANOI GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THROUGH ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS IN HANOI WERE WELCOME TO EVACUATE TO A SAFER SPOT SIXTY KILOMETERS TO THE NORTHWEST OF HANOI.

FOR PERMISSION FROM DJAKARTA TO DO SO BUT WAS TOLD IN RESPONSE

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

OF MINISTRIES OF GOVERNMENT HAD EITHER REMOVED FROM HANOI OR WERE RESETTLED IN UNDERGROUND BUNKERS MANY OF THE IMPORTANT PERSONAGES IN IMPORTANT MINISTRIES, EXCEPT THOSE IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY, HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN IN HANOI IN RECENT DAYS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

4. THE MORALE OF THE POPULACE, WHILE SUFFERING FROM THE
CONSTANT BOMBINGS, REMAINS HIGH AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE
YOUNG PEOPLE ESPECIALLY, TO CONTINUE FIGHTING SPEAKS WELL OF
THE FANATICAL DISCIPLINE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION HAS ACHIEVED.
THEY ARE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT
AND PACFLT. [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS SECRET [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
SECRET [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

EARLY JUNE 1967

SUBJECT

ALLEGED VIET CONG USE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF
WAR IN NGHIA HANH DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI
PROVINCE, TO TEACH CADRES ENGLISH

ACQ

VIETNAM, [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

1. IN EARLY JUNE THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE USING THREE
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) TO TEACH VC CADRES ENGLISH AT
PHU THO HAMLET, NGHAI PHU VILLAGE, NGHIA HANH DISTRICT, QUANG
NGAI PROVINCE, ACCORDING TO VC GUARDS IN THE HAMLET. THE POWS,
ALLEGEDLY CAPTURED IN DUC PHO DISTRICT, WERE DETAINED IN A SHELTER
IN A FOREST AREA ADJOINING THE HAMLET DURING THE DAY. AT NIGHT
THE VC TAKE THEM TO THE HAMLET. THEY ARE TREATED WELL.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

usually B1.

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

30 MAR 1993

UND 927654
20C. #41 (IN PART)

2. (FIELD COMMENT: TWO EARLIER REPORTS, [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] CONCERNED THE CAPTURE OF FOUR AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN QUANG NGAI. ONE [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] STATED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOUR AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED ON 21 APRIL AT THE THUONG HOA RIVER BY A BINH SON DISTRICT VC MAIN FORCE OPERATING IN THE AREA OF BINH LANH, BINH THONG, BINH KY, BINH AN AND BINH NAM VILLAGES IN EASTERN BINH SON. THE OTHER [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] REPORTED THAT FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AT A "SECRET TUNNEL" AT THE THUONG HOA, BINH LANE VILLAGE (BS 630974) ON 21 APRIL. THEY WERE TO BE MOVED SOON TO A WESTERN AREA.

[REDACTED] REPORTED A VC DETENTION CAMP LOCATED AT THE WESTERN EDGE OF PHU KHUONG HAMLET, NGHIA PHU VILLAGE, WITH TWO OR THREE AMERICANS UNDER DETENTION.)

3. REQUIREMENT REFERENCE D-IE6-14883.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USARV USMACV CORDE
NAVFORV-7TH AIR FORCE DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF
PACFLT III MAF

1.3(a)(4)

NOTE: ARMY E4 MANGINO, E7 NIDDS, E3 WINTERS, AND
E3 HENSENBERG FIT THE DESCRIPTION OF THIS REPORT.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2-1786

COUNTRY South Vietnam
 SUBJECT Viet Cong Prison System in
 Binh Long Province

REPORT NO. C-311/07913-67
 DATE DISTR. 20 July 1967
 NO. PAGES 2
 REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 30 December 1965-17 April 1967
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. (Vietnam, Binh Hoa)
 (29 June 1967)

THIS IS UNRELIABLE INFORMATION. SOURCE CREDITS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPARENTLY OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. Summary: During the period 30 December 1965-17 April 1967, the Viet Cong (VC) in Binh Long Province had five prison camps known as B5, B4, B3, B2 and B1. The first camp, B5, appeared to be a holding area where a prisoner's disposition was decided. In camps B4 and B3, interrogations were conducted. At B2, the final decision was made as to whether a prisoner was to be executed or released. A prisoner slated for release was then moved to B1, where he underwent daily indoctrination and had to sign a statement that he would keep secret everything he had seen. All five camps were composed of thatched huts and were well guarded. There was no indication that any of the five camps held American prisoners.
2. During the period 30 December 1965-17 April 1967, the Viet Cong (VC) in Binh Long Province appeared to have a system of handling prisoners of all categories that involved the use of five successive detention camps designated B5, B4, B3, B2 and B1. Each camp served a specific function and prisoners were moved from one camp to the next one in accordance with what appeared to be a standardized system. The specific functions of the individual camps were the following:

5
4
3
2
1

STATE # DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA AID
 JUSPAO USMACV USARV USAF 7AF 525HQ 5CORDS 5DST 50/CSY 5CINCPAC PACAF 2AF 1AF 3AF
 (Note: Field distribution indicated by "a")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 20 Aug 1967

DIA #91

#37

S-2492
a. The first camp into which a prisoner was introduced was Camp B5, located 15 kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh City (exact location unknown). The initial decision concerning the prisoner's disposition probably was taken here. After an undetermined period of time, the prisoner would be transferred to Camp B4. (S-2492) p. 55104

S-317
b. At Camp B4, the prisoner was interrogated frequently, usually about the same subjects, namely, personal background, American and Vietnamese intelligence services worked for, etc. Prisoners were sometimes tortured and were forced to dig trenches and foxholes around the prison compound. The camp was located at approximately XT 905967 and consisted of six thatched houses, each 5 x 10 meters in size and housing 46 prisoners, guarded by about 70 VC. The prisoners were mainly Montagnards, Cambodians and Vietnamese. 13 km SE of SRDK RUMPH LAD 114530N 105445E 6332 II 4444

S-318
c. At Camp B3, located at approximately XU 887034, prisoners underwent further interrogation. The camp consisted of nine thatched houses and was the strongest of the five in terms of defensive positions. Three trails were used to reach B3: one from Loi Minh Hamlet, one from Tra Thanh Village, and the third from the Song Be River, which forms the natural boundary between Government of Vietnam Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces. All other trails leading to B3 were mined and/or trapped with spike pits. Normally, about 90 VC were stationed permanently at the camp, but, on occasion, there were as many as 800. One prisoner succeeded in escaping from B3 but was shortly recaptured and killed by the VC. 1147N 10644E 6332 II 4444

S-319
d. Camp B2 was located at XU 906107 and was where a prisoner's final fate was decided, that is, whether he was to be released or executed. Before any prisoner was executed, his crimes were announced publicly to the other prisoners. Three Vietnamese prisoners were executed in October 1966, one of them a former candidate for the National Assembly. At B2, all prisoners were kept in their cells at all times; like Camps B4 and B3, B2 held approximately 46 prisoners. The permanent guard force was composed of between 150 and 200 Montagnards. 1147N 10644E 6332 II 4444

S-320
e. If it was decided to free a prisoner, he was then transferred to Camp B1, located at XU 980111. He remained here for an indeterminate time, during which he was subjected to daily indoctrination and was finally forced to write a declaration stating that he would keep secret after his release everything he had seen. As the final step, the prisoner was led to Tra Thanh Village, where he was set free. At B1, 32 prisoners were confined in 26 thatched houses. An estimated 150 VC were in the camp. On occasion the camp served as a temporary base for regular units moving through the area. Once, about 1,500 VC troops camped there for the night. PHUOC BINH 1147N 10644E 6332 II 4444

Comment: It cannot be determined from Source's comments if this procedure was standard for handling all VC prisoners or if Source's experiences were unique. Source was also unable to identify the particular point at which each prisoner is introduced into this VC penal system. At no time during the 17 months he spent in the five camps described did he see any American prisoners.

RAND

SEP 8 1967

W15717
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)

SUBJECT : Captured US Pilot in HAI PHONG Province,

DATE OF REPORT : 27/7/67

DATE OF INFO : November 1966

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE : 15 July 1967 (O-N)

OF ACQUISITION : DA NANG, Vietnam

REF : None

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY

Source saw a captured American pilot near HAI PHONG city in November 1966. Source spoke with the three security men guarding the American prisoner and learned that he was being taken to HANOI to be detained with "600" other American prisoners who were being detained in a four-story building. These security guards stated that the American POW's were being well cared for and were receiving the equivalent of "a general's ration." Source could provide no additional data regarding the POW's.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS: 1.3(a)(4)

None

NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

AUG 29 1967
Postal Registry No. 35774

NND 927661-95

1. Source saw a captured American pilot (not handcuffed) riding in a jeep accompanied by three security guards near HAI PHONG City in November 1966. The pilot had been flying a jet when he was shot down, but Source did not know the type of aircraft.
2. Source described the American pilot as Caucasian ("He had pink skin.") and having light blue eyes. He did not know the name or rank of the prisoner.
3. From the security guards, Source learned that the pilot was being taken to HANOI to join "600" other American prisoners who were being detained in a four-story building. Source did not know the location of the building but stated that the top three floors were for American POW's and the bottom floor for the guards. The security guards also stated that the American POW's were being well cared for and were receiving the equivalent of "a general's ration."
4. Source could provide no additional data regarding the POW's.

1.3(a)(4)

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SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

2-1781

DATE 28 JULY
IN 20695
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 25 JULY 1967

SUBJECT 1. USE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS FOR FORCED LABOR
PROJECTS IN HANOI

ACQ

SOURCE

1. APPROXIMATELY 100 AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE ENGAGED EVERY DAY
IN PAINTING THE RED RIVER BRIDGE IN HANOI. COMMENT: SOURCE
PRESUMABLY REFERS TO THE PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE. When? IAS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 20 SEP 67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

CO-2
REF ID: A66789
IN 30410

PAGE 1 OF 2 PA

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

131241Z

CITE 1005 - 314/12110-67

181 15 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: LATE MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: LOCATION IN HANOI FOR AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR

ACQ:

SOURCE:

N-61

000 448 255 (2) 21110/101110

1. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR NEAR THEIR PLACE OF DETENTION IN THE CENTRAL PART OF HANOI IN LATE MARCH 1967. THE PRISONERS WERE MOVED IN THE PHU GIA MOTEL WHICH FACES LE LOI BOULEVARD (AXA LE THAI TO), NEAR LAKE HOAN KIE. [REDACTED] SAW THE PRISONERS WALKING ALONG THE LAKE DURING THE EVENING. THEY WERE WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHES, BLUE TROUSERS AND WHITE SHIRTS. THE OWNER OF A CAFE IN THE AREA TOLD [REDACTED] THERE WERE 182 OF THEM.

A-11001

DIA 494

6151-11

AF VI-11

500 94

617 #41E

(547,64/100 11)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 2014

[REDACTED] SAID THE PHU GIA HOTEL IS BETWEEN RUE CAU GO, JUST NO. 1 OF THE NORTHERN END OF THE LAKE, AND BOULEVARD LE LOI WHICH PARALLELS THE LAKE'S WEST SIDE.

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: AVAILABLE STREET MAPS OF HANOI SHOW THAT LAKE HOAN KIEN IS CENTERED AT WJ 8927. [REDACTED] PROVIDED SKETCHES OF THE HOTEL'S LOCATION WHICH CHECK OUT WELL WITH MAPS OF HANOI, INCLUDING THE NAMES OF OTHER MAJOR THOROUGHFARES IN THE VICINITY AND THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE LAKE.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

unity club
WJ 889 251 Fleet Ref Single Store
0616-03079
club # 2
WJ 891 255
0616-03078
2nd Flr Fleet T. 1. Roof

INFO: CJCS-1 J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 S/DEF-7/
ASD/ISA-5 DIA-15 CSA-1 CND-2 CSAF-4 CMC-3
FILE-1045X ASD/ISA-1(45)JST/HZ

29422

2-1802

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

STANDARD FORM 64-1 (Rev. 1-67)

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REF TDCS-311/25-16-67

DATE 6 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOY APRIL - JUNE 1967

SUBJECT WEST COAST POLICE TOWARD PRISONERS OF WAR

OCT 6 1967

ADD

SOURCE

S-359 +
S-360

DIA #102

pg # 700 #47

Encl 102 (S-42, 60700-4A)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 20 APR 2008

IN TELETYPE

TOCS -314/15016-67

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

SUMMARY. VIET CONG /VC/ INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HANDLING OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE SEARCH OF PRISONERS FOR DOCUMENTS AND WEAPONS AND TRANSFER FROM BOUND TO COMPANY LEVEL FOR EVACUATION. PRISONERS WERE TO BE TURNED OVER TO THE NEAREST LOCAL ORGANIZATION WITH ADEQUATE CONFINEMENT FACILITIES. AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE SENT TO NORTH VIETNAM. IN APRIL 1967 SIX GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PRISONERS WERE CONFINED IN CAI LAY DISTRICT, DINH TUONG PROVINCE, AND IN JUNE 55 U.S. PRISONERS WERE SEEN IMPRISONED IN CAI BE DISTRICT. ~~THE~~ REMARKS. THE 243RD VIET CONG /VC/ BATTALION ORGANIZED A REORIENTATION AND TRAINING COURSE DURING A TEMPORARY STOP AT THE CANAL 28 AREA IN CAI BE DISTRICT, DINH TUONG PROVINCE, PART OF WHICH DEALT WITH PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR. THE VC DIVIDED PRISONERS INTO THE THREE CATEGORIES-- U.S. PRISONERS, KOREAN PRISONERS AND GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ PRISONERS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER CAPTURING ENEMY PERSONNEL IN AN ENGAGEMENT, THE VC WERE TO SEARCH THEM FOR DOCUMENTS AND WEAPONS AND THEN TIE AND BLINDFOLD THEM. THE VC WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO KILL OR MISTREAT

IN TELETYPE

VOCS 0314/25015-67

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

[REDACTED]

PRISONERS, NOT TO CONFISCATE THEIR PROPERTY AND TO ADOPT A FRIENDLY MANNER. EACH VC CADRE AND SOLDIER WAS GIVEN A PAMPHLET CONTAINING 36 ENGLISH WORDS WHICH COULD BE USED TO GIVE ORDERS DURING THE EVACUATION OF A PRISONER. MOST OF THE TROOPS DID NOT MEMORIZE THEM, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE TAUGHT THE PROPER PRONUNCIATIONS AND ENCOURAGED TO STUDY.

2. PRISONERS TAKEN BY THE VC WERE TRANSFERRED FROM SQUAD TO COMPANY LEVEL, WHERE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR EVACUATION WAS ASSUMED BY THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM BECAUSE ITS MEMBERS WERE WELL TRAINED IN THE HANDLING OF THIS KIND OF OPERATION. BATTALION ORDERS SPECIFIED THAT PRISONERS SHOULD BE TURNED OVER TO LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR INTERROGATION AND CONFINEMENT- THESE LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS COULD BE AT VILLAGE, DISTRICT OR PROVINCE LEVEL. EVACUATION OF PRISONERS FROM A MILITARY TO A LOCAL UNIT DEPENDED ON OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA. THE NEAREST ORGANIZATION WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECEIVING ANY PRISONERS, ALTHOUGH MOST LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS DID NOT HAVE ADEQUATE JAILS. AS A RESULT, MOST PRISONERS WERE SENT TO HIGHER LEVELS WHICH HAD CONFINEMENT FACILITIES. AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE SENT TO NORTH VIETNAM AFTER CAPTURE. [REDACTED] COMMENT-- THE BATTALION POLITICAL

[REDACTED]

IN TRIPOUGH

TCR -31/25016-67

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

10487

OFFICER TOLD THE TROOPS THAT THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE USED TO DEMONSTRATE AMERICAN ABBRESSION BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

3. IN APRIL 1967 SIX CAPTIVES WERE CONFINED IN MANLET 15 OF ONE TRUNG VILLAGE, (CAI LAY) DISTRICT, DINH TUONG PROVINCE. LOCAL VC CADRES SAID THAT THESE CAPTIVES WERE SVN POLICEMEN AND

INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. THIRTY-THREE U.S. COMMANDOS WERE IMPRISONED IN MAN 15 VILLAGE, (CAI BE) DISTRICT, DINH TUONG PROVINCE, IN JUNE 1967. THEY HAD BEEN CAPTURED AFTER A BATTLE IN THE GIUA CANAL AREA OF CAI BE DISTRICT, DINH TUONG PROVINCE.

5. FIELD DISSEM-- STATE USAID JUSPAD DORDS USMACV USARV
NAVFORV SAVINUSERVO 7TH AIR FORCE DIST 38/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC
ARPAC-PACAF FACFLT

CAMP LOG # 5-359

REPORT LOG # 700

150,000 Coord: XS 240 420
MC 48-7
1:250,000 Coord: 101945N 10608E

UTM Coord: 101945N 10608E

INFO Card:

CAMP LOG # 5-360

REPORT LOG # 700

150,000 Coord: XS 090 580
MC 48-7
1:250,000 Coord: 1053915E

UTM Coord: 1053915E

INFO Card:

COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : VC Policy On Treatment Of Allied
POW's, Punishment For Violators,
Medical Treatment Available to POW's

DATE OF REPORT : 24/10/67

DATE OF INFO : 1964 - 7 January 1967.

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

SOURCE:

SUMMARY

VC were told to treat prisoners of war (POW's) well and to give them sufficient food; soldiers could not beat or insult prisoners. NVA units upheld these regulations, but local VC militia and guerrillas committed numerous violations. Cadres who violated orders were first demoted and then transferred; soldiers were first criticised and then sent for re-education. ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN) POW's were subjected to "thought return" and were released when they were believed to be converted to the VC mode of thinking. Medical treatment for Allied POW's on the battlefield consisted of bandaging, injections of Vitamin K to stop bleeding, penicillin injections and blood transfusions.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

None

ENCL(C)

TO

Approved for Release

Date

August 1993

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

1. VC units in VC Military Region IV were told, as of January 1967, to treat U.S. POW's well, and to provide them with sufficient food (quantities unknown). The VC had the right to confiscate a prisoner's weapon, but not his personal belongings unless a list was made in order to ensure that the items were returned when the prisoner was released. The VC were not permitted to beat or insult the POW's, and they were to give them the same amount of food as was given the VC soldiers. There was to be strict enforcement of the policies; however, the NVA units upheld them, but the local VC militia and guerrillas committed numerous violations of the rules. These reports of ill-treatment by others were used to teach the men how to act properly towards POW's.
2. If a cadre beat a POW or instructed another man to beat or shoot a prisoner, or if a soldier beat a POW and the cadre did not punish him for the ill-treatment, the cadre was demoted for the first offense and transferred if he committed a second offense. When a soldier stole from a POW or beat him, the first time he was criticized in front of the unit; for the second offense he was sent to be re-educated. After two occurrences, the man was transferred to a Rear Services unit and not allowed to be in combat. The offense was also noted in his records, and his case was publicized as an example for others.
In one case, a soldier had beaten a GVN POW because he had not raised his hands when ordered. The soldier was subsequently criticized at company and battalion levels and sent for a one-week re-education course at company level. The duration of the course depended on the seriousness of the violation, but the usual length was one-week at the company, and was conducted by the political officer. In another case, when a soldier was not polite to a U.S. prisoner and complained about having to care for him during evacuation from the battlefield, he was sent for similar re-training.
3. ARVN POW's underwent a two-week to three-month thought reform course after which they were released if it was felt that they were convinced of their mistake in following the GVN. If, during the re-education, they attempted to escape, the process was begun again, until the individual was persuaded to believe in the VC line of thinking. After that they were free to choose whether to go to GVN, or VC, controlled areas. However, if U.S., Korean, or other Allied troops tried to escape, they were sent to higher headquarters in SVN for thought reform and interrogation.
The U.S. and other POW's were shot while escaping only if they did not heed the warning of the VC to stop.
4. Medical treatment on the battlefield for Allied POW's consisted of bandaging, injections of Vitamin K to stop the bleeding, penicillin injections and blood transfusions, if necessary. The blood plasma was obtained from the medical organization of the Military Region concerned; it was purchased in Saigon and was of French origin. The Vitamin K and penicillin were also bought in Saigon and were of French origin. The process of buying these medical supplies took 15 to 20 days, and it was a difficult procedure due to the problems the traders had in concealing the items while transporting them. As of January 1967 MR IV had a shortage of penicillin, vitamins and the other more expensive drugs; reserves were low, because the items were difficult to obtain. A medic of the MR IV Political and Military Training School said that the labels of some drugs were in English, and that these had been bought in Saigon and supplied to the unit by MR IV headquarters.

1.3(a)(4)

1.

1.3(a)(4)

2. Two captured US Pilots.

a. On 9 Oct 66,

[] CHI LE VIL, YEN THUY Dist, HOA BINH Prov, NVN, []
[] at 1500 hours [] three F-105s (identified from drawings)
began circling over the village: []

[] The planes
circled five or six times and fired one rocket. A small thatched food stand (5 x 8 meters) was destroyed. There were no injuries, since all were in the shelters. No other ordinance was known to have been expended while they were in the shelters. [] the three planes were probably searching for the two other F-105s that had been shot down near the village earlier that afternoon. They did not say how the planes had been shot down, but did say that two of the pilots had been captured not far from the village (location unknown). The villagers [] mentioned that they had traveled by bicycle, to the wreckage of one of the planes to pick up pieces of metal and wire for their personal use. They saw no bodies in the wreckage.

b. At 1900 hours that day, []

heading toward NHO QUAN Dist, NAM DINH Prov, NVN. At the side of the road leading out of CHI LE VIL, YEN THUY Dist, HOA BINH Prov, NVN, one jeep and one military canvas covered truck, were parked. A group of 10 civilians from the village were gathered about two US pilots. The people were kept five meters distant from the pilots, by five or six guards. The prisoners were followed closely by three armed guards, one on each side and one a distance of one meter behind. The flanking guards each carried one AK-47. The prisoners were kept three meters apart by the guards. The rear guard carried a pistol. The unit and ranks of the guards could not be distinguished because of darkness. The prisoners were being escorted to the jeep mentioned above. They got into the back seat and the two guards armed with AK-47s sat down on either side of the prisoners. A driver and the pistol armed guard sat in the front seat. The remaining guards got into the canvas covered truck mentioned above. [] The prisoners were approximately 1.7 meters tall. They were wearing white "T"

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

shirts and dark pants. They wore no hats and had combat boots on. The pilots were taller than their Vietnamese captors. [no further information regarding the physical description of the prisoners due to darkness; however, the prisoners appeared to be in good physical condition. (No further information.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : NVA Policy on the Treatment of
POW's and U.S. War Dead

DATE OF REPORT : 13/11/67

DATE OF INFO : January 1967

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

SOURCE:

SUMMARY

Source attended a lecture given by the unit political officer concerning the expected treatment of U.S./GVN prisoners and the handling of American war dead. Special treatment was to be accorded to the GVN soldiers who voluntarily surrendered. He was to be given extra rations, medicines, and a certain degree of personal liberty during the time he was being encouraged to join the VC. The treatment captured prisoners were to receive varied, depending on whether they were passive or hostile. VC policy towards U.S. war dead varied according to battlefield conditions. Weapons were to be retrieved whenever possible. American bodies would also be recovered if it was safe to do so. They were to be searched and all documents and personal effects, and papers were to be removed before burying. These articles were to be forwarded to unit headquarters.

Approved for Release

Date August 1993

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

None

ENCL NO / TCIR6-328 845767

1.3(a)(4)

1. Prior to infiltrating SVN (January 1967) Source's 170-man company was assembled and lectured by the political officer on the treatment of prisoners of war and the handling of U.S. war dead.
2. Prisoners were to be well treated and not manhandled. The overall treatment of POWS were to receive varied according to which of the three categories they fell into. One who surrendered voluntarily to the VC was to be well fed issued pills for illnesses such as malaria, and not confined. He would be propagandized to follow the VC and freed after a period of instruction with the option of joining the VC or returning to his home. The prisoners who was captured but remained passive throughout his detention would also be encouraged to follow the VC. The stubborn prisoner would receive no benefits or special considerations. Source alleges that he did not know how or if this policy was practiced as his unit did not capture any prisoners. Enemy wounded were to be cared for and helped. Source did not hear of or receive any instructions to shoot seriously wounded U.S. or GVN soldiers.
3. VC policy towards U.S. dead varied according to battlefield conditions. Bodies of fallen U.S. soldiers were to left alone during heated engagements; their weapons were to be collected if possible. In the event there was no danger to the VC and time was not of the essence, U.S. bodies were to be recovered, divested of all documents, personal effects, papers and weapons, and then buried. Everything taken from a body was to be sent to company headquarters. Soldiers who were caught keeping one of the items would be punished. Source did not know where these effects were taken after reaching unit headquarters. The men were not informed of the reason why they had to bury the bodies, but were told to treat the corpses with courtesy for "Americans and Vietnamese are no longer enemies in death".

1.3(a)(4)

55389

INFO: CJCS-1 J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 SDEF-7 J1-2 ASD/SA-1
 ASD/ISA-5 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-4 CMC-3
 FILE-1(48) JHA/JB

CALL 53337
 FOR NMCC/MC
 PAGE 1 OF 1

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIRC [REDACTED] USIA [REDACTED] AIG [REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-324/17379-67

DIST 5 DECEMBER 1967

5 23 29 Z

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE SEPTEMBER - EARLY OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT 1. LOCATION OF PRISON FOR AMERICAN PILOTS IN HAIPHONG
 2. AMERICAN PILOTS DOWNED OVER NORTH VIETNAM ON 21 SEP-
 TEMBER AND 3 AND 4 OCTOBER 1967

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

A PRISON WHERE

CAPTURED AMERICAN PILOTS ARE INTERNEED IS LOCATED IN THE VICINITY
 OF AN UNIDENTIFIED BRIDGE ON THE SONG LAP RIVER, APPROXIMATELY
 1,000 FEET EAST OF THE CONFLUENCE OF THE SONG LAP AND SONG TRAM
 BAC RIVERS.

CAMP LOG # [REDACTED]
 REPORT LOG # [REDACTED]
 INFO Card [REDACTED]
 JTM Card [REDACTED]
 1250000 Coord [REDACTED]

DIA #108

000208

#55

Encl 108 (S-47, 601/00-VH)

2.

A. ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT 1230, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FIRE. THE PILOT EJECTED SAFELY BUT WAS KILLED WHEN HE LANDED ON ROCKY TERRAIN FOUR TO FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH EAST OF HAIPHONG.

THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 27 YEARS OLD.

B. ON 3 OCTOBER 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1600, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FIRE AND CRASHED INTO THE SONG DA BACH RIVER. THE PILOT PARACHUTED SAFELY INTO THE RIVER AND WAS RESCUED BY AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

[REDACTED] (flash control) (flash control)

[REDACTED] COMMENT. NORTH VIETNAMESE FISHERMEN ARE ARMED WITH RIFLES AND SIDEARMS. THEY REPORTEDLY HAVE KILLED AMERICAN PILOTS WHO HAVE PARACHUTED INTO THE RIVER NEAR THEIR VESSELS.)

C. ON 4 OCTOBER 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1200, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT HAIPHONG [REDACTED] THE [REDACTED] PILOT WAS CAPTURED AND INTERNED. [REDACTED] *see attached*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT
NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG
DO46/OSI USARJ DET4/FTD [REDACTED] GP-1

[REDACTED]

INFO: CJCS-1 J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 SDEF-7
ASD/ISA-5 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-4 CMC-3
J1-2 ASD/SA-1 FILE-1(48) LAW/CF

CORRECTION TO 5 5 3 8 9

(61513)

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PAGES

NSA ONE ORR DCS AID CDS

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CITE TDCS-314/17379-67 CORRECT

8-20 59'2

DIST 8 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT 1. LOCATION OF PRISON FOR AMERICAN PILOTS IN HAIPHONG
2. AMERICAN PILOTS DOWNED OVER NORTH VIETNAM ON 21 SEPTEMBER
AND 3 AND 4 OCTOBER 1967

ACQ

SOURCE

CORRECTION

1. A THREE-PAGE INFORMATION REPORT WITH THE ABOVE NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON
5 DECEMBER 1967. IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2C THE WORDS

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARNATT NAVATT
AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISAJ SAF 649980 500MIG DO46/OSI USARJ
DET4/PTD

5
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SDQ	ONE
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JIC	NSA	SDQ	ONE
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1.5(c)
3.4(b)

without a receipt. Recipients shall comply with provisions of paragraph

6-10.5., DLR 50-2.

DP-INT
NAC
TC

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

AC

1.50
3.40

COL ANDERSON
CDR WALDNER
E

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16213

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1. AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR ARE BROUGHT TO HANOI FOR DETENTION AND TRIAL AFTER CAPTURE AND INTERROGATION. THEY ARE INITIALLY DETAINED IN THE HANOI PRISON [REDACTED] COMMENT: BUILDING NO. 145 ON THE HANOI TOWN PLAN). AFTER PROCESSING, THE PRISONERS ARE TRIED FOR WAR CRIMES IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE BUILDING WHICH ALSO HOUSES THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE HEADQUARTERS (SO CONGAN) [REDACTED] COMMENT: BUILDING NO. 143 ON THE HANOI TOWN PLAN).

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. AFTER TRIAL AND SENTENCING, THE PRISONERS ARE TRANSFERRED TO A MORE PERMANENT DETENTION CENTER WHICH IS LOCATED IN AN OLD LABORATORY IMMEDIATELY BESIDE BACH MAI HOSPITAL TO THE EAST. THIS BUILDING IS AN OLD TWO STORY STRUCTURE OF TYPICAL VIETNAMESE CONSTRUCTION WHICH LIKE BACH MAI HOSPITAL HAS A LARGE BASEMENT.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD ONLY.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

RAND

MIR 1 1968
W174/0
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SUBJECT : Policy Toward U.S. Prisoners of War
and Secret Hospital for Their Treatment
in Hanoi.

DATE OF REPORT: 26/12/67

DATE OF INFO : January - February 1966

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE : 20 December 1967 (X-U)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

REF:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

S U M M A R Y

Source read in the NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI newspapers of total number U.S. pilots shot down, the NVN policy toward treatment of U.S. prisoners. He stated he has learned from a friend of the existence of a secret hospital in HANOI for the treatment of U.S. prisoners of war.

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ATTACHMENTS:

None

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

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JAN 23 1968

Postal Registry No.

194502

NND 927661-232

1. Source said he had read the NVN newspapers NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI in January or February 1966 that most of the pilots captured during 1965 were Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, while in 1966 most of them were first Lieutenants; most of the pilots were shot down over THANH HOA PROVINCE. The newspaper also gave the names of the U.S. pilots shot down and the places where they were shot down. 1.3(a)(4)
2. The newspapers further stated the NVN policy toward U.S. prisoners. They were to receive double rations of food, which was the international standard, and were not to be beaten. Most of the people in HANOI Source talked to wondered why they had to be nice to the Americans and were angry because of the bombings and wanted to beat the U.S. prisoners. Source stated that before this policy was instituted the militia used to beat the U.S. prisoners. If this policy toward prisoners was disobeyed the person who committed the act would be criticized; if he killed a prisoner he would be condemned by the courts.
3. Source further stated that he had learned from a friend who worked at Hospital 9 in VINH YEN Village that there were POW camps and a special hospital to treat U.S. prisoners, whose locations were kept secret because the populace was angry and if they knew the location they might kill the prisoners. The friend had heard about the hospital first at a medical assembly held in March 1966 at the Medical Corps Bureau, HANOI.

RAND

APR 10 1968

W. 18191

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SUBJECT : NVN Policy Toward U.S. Prisoners
DATE OF INFO : December 1965-Early 1966
DATE AND PLACE : February 22, 1968 (X - N)
OF ACQUISITION SAIGON, Vietnam

DATE OF REPORT: 26/2/68

NO. OF PAGES : 2

REF:

SOURCE:

SUMMARY

In December 1965, Central Committee member of the LAO DONG Party, VU QUANG, stated that U.S. prisoners of war (POW's) received special treatment in the hope that in exchange for their release the NVN would gain certain concessions: withdrawal of the U.S. from SVN and replacement of bomb damaged NVN factories. NVN public resentment of U.S. pilots had cost the life of a North Korean pilot in early 1966. He was mistakenly shot for a U.S. pilot as he parachuted from his aircraft in the area of THAI NGUYEN City, THAI NGUYEN Province, NVN.

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US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

None

MAR 18 1968

Serial Registry No.

193035

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LAW, TITLE 18, U.S.C. SECTION 793 AND 794.
THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN
ANY MANNER IS AN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
PROHIBITED BY LAW.

1.3(a)(4)

1. In December 1965, VU QUANG (who in mid-1965 replaced NGUYEN VIET PHUONG) as the Secretary to the Labor Youth Group and Committee Member of the Central Committee of the LAO DONG Party) said that the policy of special treatment of U.S. POW's was made in the hopes that in exchange for their release the NVN would gain certain concessions: withdrawal of the U.S. from SVN and replacement of bomb damaged NVN factories. This POW policy had been disseminated throughout NVN, and it was hoped that the North Vietnamese would understand the importance of treating U.S. prisoners well.
2. Hate for U.S. pilots was so intense that the guerrillas would shoot at them after they had bailed out of their aircraft. In early 1966, a North Korean aircraft was shot down by a U.S. aircraft. The North Korean pilot bailed safely out over THAI NGUYEN City, THAI NGUYEN Province, NVN, but was killed by ground fire because the gunners thought he was a U.S. pilot. This incident was supposed to have been held secret but the people from THAI NGUYEN discussed it.

8

1.3(a)(4)

(2-1915)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY
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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NSC/SEC	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/INR	NSC	NSA	SSB	ONE	CNS
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240607Z

CITE 10CS-314/05070-68

INST 24 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 21 MARCH 1968

SUBJECT LOCATION OF UNITED STATES PRISONER OF WAR COMPOUND
IN HANOI

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 MARCH 1968)

SOURCE

1. APPROXIMATELY 100 UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR ARE LOCATED IN A FOUR-STORY BUILDING BETWEEN DOC NGKIA DUNG AND IOC TAN AP STREETS (APPROXIMATELY WJ 884274) IN HANOI. THE THREE UNITED STATES PILOTS, WHO WERE RELEASED RECENTLY, WERE OBSERVED LEAVING THIS BUILDING BY AUTOMOBILE.

2. THE BUILDING IS LOCATED ON THE BANK OF THE RED RIVER. IT IS OF VIETNAMESE ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN WITH FRENCH LOUVRED WINDOWS. THERE IS NO FENCE AROUND THE BUILDING AND

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DATE 1 MAY 1969

DM 76832

TDCS-314/05070-68

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(Classification) (Release controls)

NO EVIDENCE OF OBSTACLES TO PREVENT ENTRY OR EXIT FROM THE BUILDING. [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO GUARDS OR PRISONERS OBSERVED AND ALL THE WINDOWS WERE CLOSED. ONLY THE NORMAL NUMBER OF TRAFFIC POLICEMEN WERE ON DUTY IN THE AREA.

3. FIELD DISSENT STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE NAVFORV
CISCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

INFO: CJCS-1 J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 2-1811
DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAP-4 CMC-3 ASD/SA-1 FILE-11467HAI-WH 26389

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051154Z

CITE TDCR-314/05795-88

INST 5 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM
DOI 27 MARCH 1968
SUBJECT OBSERVATION OF CAUCASIAN PRISONER OF WAR
IN HANOI

ACQ

SOURCE

1. ON 27 MARCH 1968 A CAUCASIAN PRISONER WAS OBSERVED
SWEEPING THE SIDEWALK AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE PRISON ON
PHO HOA LO STREET BETWEEN HAI BA TRUNG AND LY THUONG
KIET STREETS (WJ 884249). THE PRISONER WAS DRESSED IN
BLUE PANTS AND A DIRTY GREEN JACKET WHICH HAD A NUMBER
ON BOTH THE FRONT AND BACK. THE INDIVIDUAL HAD BROWNISH
HAIR AND APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 5' 10" TALL. DURING THE
SHORT PERIOD THE PRISONER WAS UNDER OBSERVATION HE DID

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DIA # 114

8099-03 #261
Encl 114 (S-47, 601/DB-VH)

1207

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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WGC-314/05799-48

PAGE 2 C 2 PAGES

NOT LOOK AROUND BUT KEPT HIS EYES DOWNWARD. HE WAS BEING WATCHED BY TWO ARMED GUARDS.

2. MANY UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR ARE KEPT IN THIS PRISON. EACH DAY THEY ARE TRANSPORTED IN TRUCKS IN GROUPS OF SIX TO PERFORM PHYSICAL LABOR SUCH AS UNLOADING COAL AT THE THERMAL POWER PLANT AT VJ 881278 OR WORKING ON ROADS IN THE NORTHWESTERN SECTION OF HANOI.

(COMMENT: AT TIMES DURING 1967 THE PRISONERS WERE MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS TO THEIR WORK LOCATIONS, (BUT THIS IS NO LONGER TRUE.) PRIOR TO DECEMBER 1967 THE PRISONERS ALSO WORKED REPAIRING THE PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE (BUT THIS ACTIVITY HAS NOW CEASED) (COMMENT: ALL OF THE PRISONERS OBSERVED DOING PHYSICAL LABOR APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH.)

5. DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

07

DIA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information CablePRIORITY
IN 15550

PAGE 1 OF 2 P/

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE
D/NPJC		D/IAS						OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID U

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212132Z

CITE TDCS -314/08455-68

Content UNCLASSIFIED

DIST 21 MAY 1968

per 0583TS
date 8 NOV 1970

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: EARLY JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: PROPAGANDA DISPLAY OF FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS IN
KOUA PHAN PROVINCE

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. DURING THE PATHET LAO NEO NEW YEAR CELEBRATION OF 1966, WHICH FELL BETWEEN 28 DECEMBER 1966 AND 3 JANUARY 1967, FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE DISPLAYED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES IN BAN HANG LONG (VH 1262). DURING THE HALF HOUR THAT THE PILOTS WERE ON DISPLAY, A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDIST EXPLAINED TO THE VILLAGERS

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IN 15550

TDCS-314/08455-68

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THAT THE PILOTS WOULD NOT BE KILLED, BUT WOULD BE HELD FOR PRISONER EXCHANGE AFTER THE START OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PILOTS APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND VILLAGERS SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED GOOD TREATMENT; THEY WERE GETTING MILK AND OTHER FOODS TO WHICH THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED. THE PROPAGANDIST TOLD THE VILLAGERS THE PILOTS' NAMES, BUT SAI VANG HEU COULD NOT REMEMBER THEM.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC
PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS

CONFIDENTIAL

211725Z MAY 68

[REDACTED] THE SOURCE LOOKED AT PHOTOGRAPHS AND IDENTIFIED ONE PRISONER AS CAPTAIN DAVID L. MEDLICKA, AO 3863742. HE SAID THAT ANOTHER RESEMBLED CAPTAIN JAMES W. LEWIS, AO 2211197, BUT LOOKED MUCH OLDER THAN THE MAN IN THE PHOTOGRAPH. THE OTHER PRISONERS WERE SMALLER AND RESEMBLED LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE WILLIAM E. SWANSON, 543832 AND CAPTAIN THEODORE E. DRYSZAK, FV 3259659.

RAND

FEB 6 1969

W 21030
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SUBJECT : POW Facility in HANOI
DATE OF INFO : October 1967
DATE AND PLACE : 7 January 1969 (Z - W)
OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

DATE OF REPORT: 11/1/69

NO. OF PAGES : 5

REF:

1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

S U M M A R Y

A POW facility was located on YEN PHU Street, just North of NGUYEN KHAC NHU Street, in HANOI (WJ26958824). The main gate and a smaller pedestrian gate were located on YEN PHU Street, giving access to a walled-in compound, consisting of a long two-story building, which housed 200 POW's, according to a guard. Thirty or forty POW's were seen in the open space in the center of the compound, which was used as a volleyball court and basketball court. The facility was located on a busy street, in a residential area, and a street located immediately South of the compound was a popular practice spot for people learning to ride motorcycles.

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US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

1.3(a)(4)

1

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JAN 27 1969

Postal Registry No. 194 013

Approved for Release

Date September 1993

NND 927661-296

1.3(a)(4)

RAND W22971 JAN 3 1969 WASH. OFFICE
--

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)

SUBJECT : U.S. Pilot Prisoners on Parade in HANOI

DATE OF REPORT: 8/1/69

DATE OF INFO : February 1967

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION : October 1968 (J) SAIGON, Vietnam

REF:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

S U M M A R Y

At 0600 hours on a day in February 1967, a parade of U.S. pilot prisoners was announced throughout HANOI by public loudspeaker. Many people gathered to see the parade. At 0730 hours a group of 53 U.S. prisoners left HOA LO Prison and marched through various streets of HANOI. They were bound in pairs but appeared in good health. The spectators were warned by loudspeaker not to abuse the prisoners but some persons shouted at them.

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US EMBASSY (OSA)

ATTACHMENTS:

None

1.3(a)(4)

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 LIAISON OFFICE TO U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794.
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 ANY PART OF AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
 PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

NND 927661-292

1.3(a)(4)

1. About 0600 hours on a day in February 1967, the NVN government announced by public loudspeakers that a parade of captured U.S. pilots would occur in HANOI. The people were encouraged to gather and view the captured pilots but were warned to abstain from all violence and to observe international rules for prisoners of war. By 0700 hours large crowds had gathered and at 0730 hours the gate of HOA LO Prison (a former French Prison) opened and 53 U.S. pilot prisoners, formed in a column of twos, marched out. The prisoners ranked from 1st Lieutenant to Major (announced by loudspeaker) and were dressed in white clothes with stripes. Each prisoner had a number from 1 to 53 on his back. The prisoners were bound to each other in pairs by a 40 centimeter chain (left hand to right hand). The route of the march followed HOA LO, TRAN HUNG DAO, LY THUONG KIET, TRANG THI and HANG BAI Streets. Ten of the prisoners were Negro. The prisoners appeared to be in good health and walked with their eyes on the ground. They were guarded by two Armed Public Security squads armed with AK 47s.
2. The NVN government had constantly instilled hatred for the U.S. by various means of propaganda so there were some people in the crowds who demonstrated against the pilots by shouting "down with the Americans" and who wanted the pilots killed. Others, however, had more sympathy for the pilots and discussed their large stature, never having seen men that large.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

MAP REFERENCE:

Series 1000, Sheet No. 1009XHANOT, Edition 2 - AMS (2007), Scale 1/12,500

1. The POW Facility was located on YEN PHU Street, just north of NGUYEN KHAC NHU Street (WJ26958824), in an old Chinese school. It was thought to have been a Chinese school, since the architectural style was neither European nor Vietnamese.
2. Entry was gained to the compound through a small pedestrian gate, about 75 centimeters wide, adjacent to the main gate, which was the same width as the entry road, approximately 4 meters. (See Attachment 1). The main gate was 3 meters high, constructed of iron bars and barbed wire, which permitted a view of the driveway. The pedestrian gate was somewhat lower; and both gates were locked all the time.
3. A small one-man guard shack, possibly constructed of sheet metal, was located 2 meters inside the pedestrian gate. Two or three soldiers guarded the entry points, either from inside or outside the gates; but the gates always had to be unlocked from the inside. The driveway extended inside for about 30-40 meters from the gate, to a point where it made a right angle in a southerly direction and terminated at another gate about 20 meters further. It was not known what constituted the northern border of the driveway, but it seemed that the driveway was flanked by many buildings, which apparently were not a part of the compound. A brick air raid shelter, extending about 1 meter above ground was located along the southern edge of the driveway; the dimensions of the shelter were unknown, but it was thought to have a capacity of about 30 people.
4. At the point where the driveway angled south, a small one story building was located which housed the guards and the interpreter who met the visitors at the gate. While walking at any point along the driveway, the visitor did not have a clear view of the compound, except of the small dirt-surface open area, on which the air raid shelter was located. On the western edge of the driveway a fence extended from the corner to the second gate. The construction or dimensions of the fence and the gate were not known. Two individual air raid shelters, apparently intended for use by the guards, flanked the gate.
5. After entering the compound proper, a long two-story building took up the entire left hand side. The building was approximately 200 by 7 meters in size, constructed of white stone, with a pointed roof of red tile. The side of the building facing the compound had numerous doors and windows, some of which were open. The visitor came to within 4 or 5 meters from the building and noticed two or three beds through a partially open wooden door. The beds were made of wood and had iron bars on top, evidently to support a mosquito net. The size or physical characteristics of the room could not be determined. The guard said that 200 POWs were housed in the building. Community air raid shelters were located north and south of the building.
6. The center of the compound measured about 200 by 100 meters, and was occupied by a basketball court and a volleyball court, each measuring approximately 15 by 20 meters. The other side of the compound was bordered by a line of trees, of the type named SAU, behind which the compound apparently ended. Behind the trees, the old school gate was located.

1.3(a)(4)

It seemed in disuse and was probably blocked. []

[] The southern corner of the compound was apparently bordered by a one-story building, the construction or size of which was unknown. In the distance, many dwellings could be discerned, but they did not appear to be part of the compound.

7. Two soldiers, who did not have any specified position, guarded the 30 to 40 POWs that were located in the compound. Some of the POWs were engaged in a volleyball game, some were practicing basketball, while others sat around by themselves or in groups, talking or singing to the accompaniment of a guitar. The POWs were all dressed in black pajamas and rubber sandals; however, some of the men playing ball had removed their shirts. The men playing ball were shouting to one another, and in general all seemed to be happy.
8. YEN PHU Street was considered a busy thoroughfare, and moderate traffic was moving all the time. The street was separated from the compound by a three meter high stone wall, topped with barbed wire, which ran at least from the entrance gate to the corner of the main building. [] this wall, or one similar in construction, probably encircled the entire compound.) The two story main building had no windows on the first floor streetside, but it possibly had second floor windows. On the street side of the wall, a grass strip extended for three meters, planted with SAU trees, and separated from the street by a one meter wide footpath with a rock surface.
9. The main street was about 12 meters wide and paved with asphalt, bordered on the other side by another footpath, grass strip with trees and streetcar tracks. It was not known if YEN PHU had street lights, but if it did, the posts probably would be located on this side. No fire hydrants existed. The closest street car stop was 100 meters south from the southern corner of the compound.
10. The POW facility was located in a residential area, in existence for about 50 or 60 years. Dwellings were constructed in various sizes, and the inhabitants no longer represented one particular social class. No military installations were located in the immediate vicinity (sic), and the nearest open area was a soccer field, located about 1 kilometer southward, near the bridge. The street immediately south of the compound sloped down from YEN PHU Street, and this incline, considered the most dangerous in HANOI, had apparently been incorporated in the official motorcyclist's driving test. Every day, many practicing motorcyclists and others who were taking the task could be seen.
11. Student drivers had a special sign attached to their motorcycle, stating that they were students. The sign was approximately 15 by 20 centimeters, and showed red letters on a white background. It was obtained at the local Security office, and was valid for two weeks. When issued, the permit was on ordinary paper, but most riders affixed it to a rigid back, so it could be attached to their motorbike easier. Students always had to be accompanied by a licensed rider on the motorcycle, which also was good practice, since they had to carry the Security Agent when taking the test.
12. Every month or two, Security Agents stopped all motorcycle riders to check their papers; however, people who carried the learners permit were not stopped.

13. The most popular motorcycle used to be the JAVA (sic), which was Czech made, but in recent times, the East German made MZ seemed more popular. The MZ was a 125 cc, 4-speed cycle, usually blue with a white painted gas tank. Occasionally a black MZ was seen. The JAVA's were always completely red.


[] Report was completed before [] which included low level aerial photographs of the area. These photographs did not show an "Educational Institute" Southeast of the Waterworks, as marked on the referenced map. When confronted with this photographic evidence, Source still held to the original pinpoint location, which does not appear large enough to hold the facility described. When asked to point out in the photographs the buildings drawn in his sketch, he stated that since he could not discern them, they must have been bombed and destroyed since that time. In the photographs, the area located at vic WJ 88002720 on referenced map closely seemed to resemble the area described by Source, and he was asked to identify these buildings. He stated that the corner building on YEN PHU somewhat resembled the Chinese school.)

ATTACHMENT I

SOURCE SKETCH (not to Scale)
Of POW Facility on YEN PHU Street, HANOI

Page

5

NGUYEN KHAC NHU
CR PHO DUC CHINHLEGEND

1. Main gate
2. Pedestrian gate
3. Guard Post
4. Community Shelter
5. Building for guards
6. Trench
7. Fence
8. Main Building

9. Volley ball court
10. Basket ball court
11. One-story Building
12. Trees
13. Old School Gate
14. Compound Wall
15. Dwellings



Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

COUNTRY: South Vietnam

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT: Lessons Used in the Indoctrination of American Prisoners of War

DATE DISTR. 15 SEPTEMBER 1969

DATE OF INFO. June 1968

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Vietnam, Saigon

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE

Summary. A series of four lessons is given American prisoners captured in the area of Front 7. The first, after containing a brief historical review, emphasizes the unjustness of the current American participation in the war. The second develops the theme that the war is causing a split in American society. The third dwells on racial discrimination in the US and links the Negroes' struggle for civil rights to the Viet Cong cause. The last concerns the clemency policy of the Viet Cong toward American prisoners. Directed discussions follow each of the lessons. End Summary.

1. The first indoctrination lesson given American prisoners of war (POW's) in the Front 7 area of Quang Tri proposes to show them that their country's participation in the war is unjust and immoral. It is also designed to help the prisoners understand and sympathize with the Viet Cong insurgency. The lesson begins with the situation following the Geneva Accords

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NE	AID	OCR

Approved for Release
Date August 1993

of 1954, noting that the latter provided for the withdrawal of the French Army and the holding of free elections leading toward unification. It then states that the French abandoned their responsibility for supervising these elections because of the Algerian war and handed South Vietnam (SVN) over to the Americans in order to repay them for their help during the Indo-China War. The course material goes on to characterize the Diem regime as having been established by the Americans, as having been completely dependent on them, and as having been the cruelest in Vietnamese history. The Thieu-Ky Government is then described as representing the elite only, not the populace; and its support by the US is purported not to be in the latter's national interest.

2. This lesson also claims that SVN has become a virtual colony of the US, that the latter has taken over in all aspects of its life, and that this has not been to the good. Examples of this takeover are seen in the American participation in Diem's overthrow, the continued presence of US troops in the country, the complete dependence of SVN economically on American aid, and the corruption of the manners and morals of Vietnamese women (attributed in large part to the influence of American arts and entertainment). The Americans are also blamed for the spread of venereal disease in the country, the lack of adequate public hospital facilities, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the violation of traditional customs and manners, and the destruction of temples, pagodas, tombs, villages, and populations.

3. Finally, this lesson contrasts what it contends is the just and winning cause of the Viet Cong (VC) with the unjust and losing one of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and its American supporters. Comparisons are drawn here with the Americans' victory in their own War of Independence and with the failure of the French to defeat the Vietnamese during 1945-1954. Specifically, the lesson states that the Americans cannot win because the unjustness of their cause has alienated world public opinion, because they lack the support of the majority of the Vietnamese people, and because the American public will be increasingly split as the protracted guerilla warfare of the Viet Cong results in continued attrition of men and money. The Viet Cong, on the other hand, are pictured as having the support of world public opinion because of the justness of their cause, as being able to mobilize the patriotic zeal of the Vietnamese people as a result of the "American aggression," and as being experienced guerilla warriors.

4. The second lesson aims at showing the POW's that the internal cohesiveness of the US is being ruptured by its government's "absurd determination" to continue the Vietnam War. First it claims that America is facing economic disaster because of the war, that tens of billions of dollars a year must be spent on the Vietnam effort, that unemployment and poverty in America are on the increase, that the dollar is depreciating in value, and that America's overseas markets are being lost to France, West Germany, and Japan. Then the lesson points out what it considers to be the political problems caused by the war, that the split within the Democratic and Republican Parties over the war (anti-war congressmen of both parties are noted here) has compounded the pre-existing split between the two parties (which in turn is cited as the cause of the John F. and Robert Kennedy assassinations) and that the American people have shown their opposition to the war and support of the Vietnamese people in many ways; e.g., bloody demonstrations, burning of draft cards, and self-immolations. The lesson concludes that if you (the POW's) leave

1.3(a)(4)

a Vietnamese, you are going against the conscience and concepts of humanity and justice held by most of your fellow Americans. (Field comment. As presented by the source, this lesson seems ill-organized, building up an anti-war case based upon national self-interest and then switching to a moralistic appeal.)

5. The third lesson concerns racial discrimination in America and is designed to make Negro POW's fully aware of "their condition of slavery" so that they will oppose the US Government. The line is pressed here that racial discrimination is caused by the American Government and not by the American people, who respect all races. It is stated that the government fosters racial discrimination as a means of reducing the collective strength of the people, thus making their exploitation easier. The point is then made that Negroes are also human beings, are intelligent, and can contribute to society and that all people have the right to equal treatment according to the letter of the US Constitution. This is contrasted with the "facts" of segregation and the brutality and economic privation to which the American Negro has been subjected. The situation whereby the Negro becomes a soldier fighting in Vietnam is pictured as being of no benefit to him but only to the large industrial corporations which are growing rich off the war. The civil rights movement is praised as a struggle against genocide, and the assassination of Martin Luther King is presented as a sign that the US Government has embarked upon such a course of extermination. Finally, the Negro struggle in America is likened to the struggle of the Vietnamese "people" against "aggression".

6. The final lesson deals with the application of the VC "clemency policy" towards US POW's. The purpose of this lesson is to convince the prisoner that this policy stems from the humane spirit of the resistance forces. It is stated that the POW himself is not considered an enemy and that it is only the "imperialists" who fall into this category. The prisoners are told that despite the fact that they resisted the VC and committed atrocities against them, they will not be subjected to cruelty. Nevertheless, it is announced that three levels of treatment will be meted out to Americans coming under VC control, depending on whether they are "counter-war," ralliers or those willing to serve as penetration agents; "non-resisters," those who desert on the battlefield or who put up no resistance to being captured; or POW's, those forced to surrender on the battlefield. It is further stated that only weapons, binoculars, radios, compasses, helmets, watches, and fountain pens will be taken from the prisoners and that they will be left with what is considered their personal property; e.g., checks, money orders, contracts, pictures, clothes, shoes, field bags, belts, lighters, combs, and money. Finally, notice is given that the VC will do whatever it can to have delivered POW's letters to their families and to accommodate those Americans wishing not to return home but to remain in the "liberated" area.

7. The following procedures are used in teaching each lesson:

a. The classroom presentation consists of an oral verbatim reading of a previously-prepared standard text. The time required varies from six to eight hours. It is given in intervals of 50 minutes, with a 10 minute break between intervals.

b. The discussion period lasts three or four days, perhaps even longer depending on the receptivity of the

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1.3(a)(4)

particular group of POW's. The indoctrinator fields the discussion questions and monitors the subsequent discussion which it is hoped will ensue among the POW's. He keeps the discussion keyed to the particular question and observes what part of the class holds a pro-VC view and what part does not. When approximately two-thirds of the class becomes pro-VC, the discussion stops and the text of that particular lesson is re-written for its final presentation in class before proceeding to the next lesson. If two-thirds of the class fail to hold a pro-VC view, the text is re-written again, presented again, and discussed again, or else the particular indoctrinator is replaced by another one from the next higher echelon.

c. The presentation of the revised text requires two to three hours.

8. Field Dissem: STATE, USMACV, USAID, CORDS, 7th Air Force, Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only), USARV, NAVFORV, 525 MI GP, 6499 SAG, OSI, CINCPAC PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC

1.3(a)(4)



Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGE

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158-24-1-24 CNY 1000-114/00217-22

PAGE 6 JANUARY 1970

COUNTRY : LACS

DOJ POSSIBLY LATE 1969 OR EARLY 1972

SUBJECT GENERAL LOCATION OF PRISON CAMP CONTAINING ABOUT
20 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PILOTS IN THE BAN NAIKAY
REGION OF HOA PHAM PROVINCE

ACC

LADS, VIENTIANE 25 JANUARY 1978

Source

1. ABOUT 20 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PILOTS WERE IMPRISONED IN A CONCEALED SECTION OF THE BAN MAKAY /VN 1955/ AREA OF SAN KEM PROVINCE, ACCORDING TO TWO VILLAGERS WHO VISITED THE REGION TO BUY A RADIO ON AN UNSTATED DATE BUT POSSIBLY IN LATE 1969 OR EARLY 1970. WHEN THE BOMIN

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 10/20/2013

VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ GUARDS NOTICED THAT THE TWO VILLAGERS
SAW THE PILOTS, THE GUARDS SEIZED THEM AND SAID THEY TOO
WOULD BE IMPRISONED.

2. THE PATRIOT LAO FUNCTIONARY, WHO WAS SELLING THE VILLAGERS THE RADIO, INTERCEDED AND TOLD THE NVA GUARDS HE HAD TOLD THE VILLAGERS TO COME WITH HIM TO GET THE RADIO. THE NVA GUARDS RELEASED THE VILLAGERS, BUT DEMANDED THEY NOT TELL ANYONE ELSE ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE PILOTS PRISON CAMP.

3. **CONTENT.**

REPORTED ALL THE AMERICAN PRISONERS HELD IN LAOS WERE TAKEN TO NORTH VIETNAM IN LATE DECEMBER 1968. ⁶⁴² THE 27 AMERICAN PRISONERS THAT HAD BEEN IN LAOS AT THAT TIME WERE ASSEMBLED IN THE BAN HANG LONG /VN 132629/ AREA ABOUT MID-WAY BETWEEN BAN NAKAY AND SAN NEUA /VN 989079/. THEY WERE TO BE USED IN A PRISONER EXCHANGE WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. SEE [REDACTED] (DCS-310/68796-60)

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC JEA/NEP

69701



Intelligence Information Report

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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REPORT NO. CS-911/05787-70

DATE DISTR. 8 July 1970

COUNTRY South Vietnam
DOI 1966 through 1968
SUBJECT American Prisoners of War

1303-93-3

ACQ

SOURCE

[REDACTED] detention Camp A (AT 602495), Binh Duong Province, and Camp B (XT 495315), Rau Nghia Province, South Vietnam, in SR-1. These two camps were consolidated after Tet 1968 at XT 602495 and became known as the Political Office Prison for SR-1. [REDACTED] not to allow non-Vietnamese prisoners to remain in the two prison camps but to send them to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in Cambodia as soon as possible. [REDACTED] was to notify COSVN when [REDACTED] had prisoners in this category and to arrange to have them taken to Bo Hue (XT 265205) or to Bo Ba Tay (XT 170250).

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NSA

(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

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CS-311/05787-70

Cambodia. Between April 1966 and March 1970, [redacted] had in his custody the three prisoners described below. [redacted] was not sure at which detention camp he saw them.

a. One Caucasian, probably an Australian, was captured in early October 1966 while he was enroute to Cholon via the Bien Hoa Highway. The prisoner stated that he was British born, a widower and, at the time he was captured,

a civilian employee of the U.S. "Water and Land Transportation Company located in the Thu Duc District. He was about 37 years of age, weight 200 pounds, ruddy complexion, round fat face and beautiful teeth. He wore a wrist watch with an old silver casing on a wide leather wrist strap which had been given to him by his wife who had recently died from tuberculosis. He had two children whom he had left with his sister in London before coming to Vietnam for a job with good pay.

b. One American prisoner was named "Mik Kal," Vietnamese phonetic spelling. He was about 34 years of age, round face, full head of wavy light brown hair, large nose, prominent ears, about six feet tall and weighed about 180 pounds. He was captured the morning of the second day of the first attack in the 1968 Tet Offensive at Chuong Cho ("5 corner") Crossroads, Co Vap District, Gia Dinh Province. "Mik Kal" was brought to a prison camp where he stayed for almost a month. The Viet Cong (VC) unit which had captured him said that when they had unsuccessfully attacked the Co Loa Camp, they had also attacked a neighboring American camp where "Mik Kal," whom they nicknamed "Major," was captured. However, "Mik Kal" claimed to be only a civilian working in a dog training unit. At the time he was captured, "Mik Kal" wore a T-shirt which had initials printed in a circle on the front and on the back there was a dog's head.

Comment: [redacted] stated that it was a caricature of a dog with a black nose and long droopy ears.) "Mik Kal" had explained that this was the symbol of a dog training unit for which he worked. He wore a ring with a black stone on the middle finger of his right hand.

c. The second American prisoner was a 19-year old PFC (E-2), a member of the U.S. Army 5th Engineering Battalion stationed in Cu Chi, Hau K'ia Province, who had been captured when he wandered into a VC camp in about April 1968. The prisoner had been taken to a prison camp and had remained there for seven days. He claimed that he had been following a girl when he got lost and some children directed him to what turned out to be a VC camp. He was from the southwest United States and had olive skin and short black hair. He was a Spanish Catholic and when he prayed, he kissed his thumb. He said he was from the low labor class in the United States and that he had volunteered to come to Vietnam for better pay.

2. When [redacted] visited Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi in August 1965 during an Enemy Propaganda Department training course, he read brochures on five American prisoners and also talked with them. He remembered only two names: Schumacker, a Navy F-4 pilot, and Pine, a major and an F-105 pilot from Ubon, Thailand. The other three Americans were all F-105 pilots from Ubon.

3. During conversations regarding prisoners of war, [redacted] heard that Mr. Ramsey, a member of the U.S. Economic Mission (USAID), had been captured by the VC and in May 1969 Mr. Ramsey was still being held at a COSVN prison in Cambodia. He also heard that an Army NCO had been captured somewhere in the Ben Cat District, Binh Duong Province. This prisoner was nearsighted and wore very thick glasses, was a heavy smoker and very young.

CS-311/05787-70

4. ~~REDACTED~~ Comment: Preliminary coordination with the Joint Personnel Recovery Center /JPRC/, Saigon, identified "Mik Kal" as Michael H. Kjome, GS-12, Pacific Architects and Engineers, who had been missing since 31 January 1967. The second U.S. prisoner was identified as PFC Ferdinand Rodriguez of the 65th Engineering Battalion, who was believed to have been captured on 21 April 1968. However, information on the remaining prisoners was insufficient for positive identification.)

5. Field Dissemination: State USMACV USAID CORDS Dir/JUSPAO
(Mr. Nickel Only) 7th Air Force USARV NAVFORV 525th MI Gp
6449 SAG OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.



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File: 501-03

501-08 (6)

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTR. 3 December 1970

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DOI 1964 - September 1969

SUBJECT Exploitation of U.S. Prisoners
of War

708
FYI - ATC KRAAK
DOUC-ELLIS

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (8 September 70)

SOURCE

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA CRS

(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

1.3(a)(4)

Summary: The Lao Dong Party Central Committee, based on experience gained during the French resistance, established policies regarding U.S. prisoners of war which included exploiting each prisoner to the fullest extent possible. Exploitation of the prisoners was carried out by either or both the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), depending on such criteria as time and circumstances of capture, current tactical and strategic objectives, and long-range potential of individual prisoners. Information on or from the U.S. prisoners was shared with other Communist countries, principally the USSR and Cuba. End Summary.

1. (Field Comment: In the following report [] was vague and inconsistent on the exact roles played by the MPS and the MND in prisoner of war exploitation, possibly indicating that his interpretations of the delineation of responsibility between the MND and the MPS may be based on only general information. He gave a much larger role to the MPS than did several other sources whose access to this information was much more direct, although less broad, [] One source claimed that the MPS conducted no interrogations at the Hoa Lo Prison, whereas other sources reported a limited role for the MPS in this field.)

2. North Vietnamese policy, as set forth by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, concerning the handling and exploitation of U.S. prisoners of war was based on Viet Minh policy towards prisoners who had been captured during the French resistance and knowledge of prisoner exploitation which North Vietnam (NVN) had acquired from both the USSR and Communist China. The policy also drew upon the personal experiences of senior members of the NVN Government who at various times had served in French prisons or prisoner of war camps.

3. The capture of U.S. and other prisoners of war was considered the responsibility of every agency, facility and citizen in NVN. The initial screening and subsequent exploitation of each U.S. prisoner depended on the place, date and circumstances of capture and the criteria for classifying prisoners into categories. During the period of heavy U.S. bombing of NVN and the resulting destruction of transportation facilities, the established procedures for handling prisoners of war and for evacuating them to central NVN establishments were modified somewhat. The proximity to Hanoi of a province where a prisoner was captured and the availability of transportation were primary considerations affecting the immediate exploitation of a prisoner and his prompt transfer to Hanoi. Consequently, while Hanoi was subjected to heavy aerial bombings, representatives of the MPS and/or MND, depending on which was in possession of the prisoner, traveled to the province to exploit the prisoner locally, until arrangements could be made for his transfer to Hanoi.

4. Information obtained from a prisoner at each level was recorded in detail and incorporated into a "Preliminary Personal Record." The information was correlated with that already acquired on the prisoner from other sources, including, if the prisoner were a pilot, information on his aircraft, its flight plan, tactics, apparent targets and accompanying aircraft. The apparent targets were deduced from information received from the antiaircraft unit which shot down the plane and from units responsible for the physical security of the targets. This information was used to help establish the veracity of the information provided by the prisoner and to aid NVN's defense of the targets.

1.3(a)(4)

5. Exploitation of the prisoner depended upon the category in which he was placed. The categorization of prisoners depended upon the affiliation of the initial capturing/screening unit; the extent to which the prisoner had been exploited prior to his transfer to Hanoi; the prisoner's apparent areas of knowledgeability as established during preliminary screening; the prisoner's age, grade, intelligence, position and degree of cooperation; evidence of possible compromise of security within a element of the NVN Government; possibility of escape by the prisoner, and the national origin of the prisoner.

6. Prisoners handled by public security service elements when captured were transferred to MPS facilities, and prisoners handled initially by military elements in the provinces were transferred to MND detention facilities in Hanoi. The MND interrogated prisoners for tactical and strategic military information, and the MPS interrogated for political, scientific, economic and, to some degree, military information. The MND was not interested in long-range exploitation of prisoners, and it confined its activities primarily to the collection of tactical and strategic military information, with little time given to longer range objectives. The responsibility of the MND was considerably broader than that of the MPS in collecting tactical and strategic military information. Information collected by the MND was passed to the MPS Combined Research Agency for review to determine if requirements from other government agencies had been satisfied. Information collected by the MPS was similarly passed to the MND. (Field Comment: [] did not know what requirements from other NVN agencies were serviced. He was not acquainted with the specific MND elements involved in this, other than the information was passed to the MND's Intelligence Department /Cuc Tinh Bao/.)

7. The assignment of a prisoner to either the MPS or the MND depended not only on factors enumerated in paragraph 5 but also on the prisoner's "Preliminary Personal Record" and on the MND or MPS screening which occurred at the central level upon the prisoner's arrival in Hanoi to determine more precisely the prisoner's areas of knowledgeability. The ensuing interrogations, whether conducted by the MND or the MPS, included the following:

- a. Enemy combat tactics, techniques and order of battle.
- b. Enemy personnel, morale, fighting spirit and motivation factors.
- c. Enemy weaponry, technical equipment and war materiel, with especial attention to enemy use of armor and armored vehicles.
- d. Enemy knowledge of the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Vietnam (SVN) generally, and specifically in the prisoner's activity and field of interest.
- e. History of enemy presence in SVN, units and activities.
- f. War-making potential of the enemy and his units both in SVN and other areas where enemy support and reinforcements could be obtained.
- g. Nature of coordination and cooperation between U.S. and other Allied units, including relationship between Allied units and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces.
- h. Economic war-making potential of the U.S., concentrating on information regarding production capabilities of U.S. war-related industries.

1.3(a)(4)

i. Social class origin of members of U.S. military services. [] the MND reportedly had established that most members of the U.S. Air Force were from the wealthier social class, whereas infantry and artillery troops were from the poorer, less-educated social class.) 1.3(a)(4)

j. Professional background, psychological makeup and aspirations of the prisoner.

k. General knowledge and comprehension of Americans in SVN of the military, political and economic situations in SVN and other countries.

l. Behavior, mental attitude and viewpoints of Americans while under combat stress in SVN.

m. Professional backgrounds and previous assignments of other U.S. prisoners in NVN.

n. Effect of NVN's ideological indoctrination programs on U.S. prisoners in NVN and results of NVN military proselyting efforts in SVN.

8. Interrogations were aimed at gaining the complete cooperation of a prisoner so his services could be employed in anti-war activities such as letter writing to Americans in the U.S., including not only relatives and friends but also individuals whose names had been obtained from other prisoners; making pro-NVN and anti-U.S. radio broadcasts; and other forms of propaganda. After a prisoner had cooperated, he might be employed in technical fields where his specialized knowledge could be used. U.S. prisoners were indoctrinated to adopt a friendly attitude toward NVN and upon their return to the U.S. to convey a pro-NVN, anti-war feeling to their families, friends and relatives. [] this followed the example of Viet Minh proselyting activities against French prisoners. The Viet Minh objective was to recruit as many French prisoners as possible to foment revolutions against the French Government and the governments of French-dominated countries. [] the MPS and MND did not believe that U.S. prisoners could be successfully proselyted into attempting a revolution in the U.S.) 1.3(a)(4)

9. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC []



Intelligence Information Report

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File ~~502-01.3~~ 501-08(6)

PAGE 1 OF 57 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. ☐

DATE DISTR. 10 December 1970

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DOI 1964-September 1969

SUBJECT Evacuation, Escape Attempts, Illnesses and Detention of American Prisoners of War

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (9 September 1970)

SOURCE ☐

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(classification)

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
<input type="checkbox"/>							

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

REF ID: A7660-163

Summary: American prisoners of war captured in North and South Vietnam were evacuated to central facilities in North Vietnam (NVN) as expeditiously as circumstances permitted. Those captured in South Vietnam (SVN) were evacuated via routes used by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to infiltrate its units into SVN. One escape attempt became known. North Vietnam valued American POW's as potentially very valuable sources of information. Illnesses suffered by American prisoners of war while in captivity in NVN included cachexia, general fatigue and neurasthenia. Some prisoners, because of their lack of cooperation with the NVN interrogators, were identified as "hard core" although a more appropriate terminology would be "wayward" or "stubborn." End Summary.

1. All Americans captured in SVN were evacuated to NVN as soon as possible, consistent with good security procedures and with the combat situation in each area of SVN. While limited exploitation of American prisoners was permitted in SVN, policy dictated that all Americans be evacuated as soon as local exploitation was concluded. No American prisoners were held in SVN beyond the time needed to exploit them for tactical information.

all captured Americans were evacuated to Hanoi within less than six months after capture.)

2. Local exploitation in SVN, particularly of the more knowledgeable Americans, was conducted by NVA military intelligence representatives who were primarily interested in the protection of local NVA and Viet Cong (VC) facilities and concentrations from Allied attack. This exploitation was concluded as quickly as possible so the prisoner could be evacuated to NVN. Strict accountability procedures existed for each captured American, and no VC/NVA commander wished to assume responsibility for his safety longer than was necessary.

3. American prisoners were evacuated to NVN along the same routes as those used by the NVA to infiltrate its personnel into SVN or to evacuate wounded to NVN. Some Americans, like the VC/NVA wounded, were evacuated by truck from those areas which received supplies from NVN by truck, but most traveled on foot. Empty trucks returning to NVN from the Quang Tri Province area in particular were occasionally used to transport American prisoners to NVN, and vehicles which transported supplies as far south as Kontum Province were also sometimes used. Because truck and train transport was subject to air attack, even in NVN, most prisoners continued their journey in NVN on foot. Fewer VC/NVA ill and wounded were evacuated to NVN from southern SVN than from central and northern SVN.

4. Each captured American was considered both a valuable hostage and a potential source of important information. Accordingly, no VC/NVA commander, given the fluid combat situation in SVN, wished to run the risk of having a captured American escape once the prisoner came under his jurisdiction. Since there were no secure detention facilities in SVN, lower echelons transferred Americans to higher echelons and then to the central level in NVN as promptly as possible.

5. [] was not aware of any escapes or attempted escapes by American prisoners in SVN. Through interrogations, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) learned that U.S. pilots had reportedly

been briefed to evade capture if downed over NVN by promptly signalling other aircraft to rescue them or by taking shelter in mountainous areas of NVN. They also had been instructed to seek out shelter in any foreign embassy in Hanoi if this were possible. According to information provided during official briefings, all foreign embassies in Hanoi were intensely interested in the presence of American prisoners in NVN. NVN therefore did not exclude the possibility that the foreign embassies, including Communist bloc embassies, would attempt to smuggle American prisoners out of NVN.

6. While in SVN, [] learned about the attempted escape of two American prisoners in NVN. In late 1967, two American pilots from the U.S. 7th Fleet escaped from Hoa Lo Prison about one month after their capture and after their initial exploitation had been concluded. The prisoners, who had given the impression of being cooperative, were able to break out of the prison during the night while the regular guard was attending a Party meeting. They hid their escape from a substitute guard by placing matting under the bed covers, and the escape was not detected until the following morning. Search attempts, coordinated by the MPS and the MND, were concentrated in the area of the Gia Lam airport because it was believed that the escapees would attempt to steal a plane. Dogs tracked the escapees to the Hong River, and the search was then concentrated in the down-stream direction. Public Security Services and NVA personnel were used from the adjacent districts and provinces to aid in the search.

7. The escapees were accidentally found in a clump of bushes by a group of students in an area north of the Long Bien Bridge, about three kilometers upstream from the point where the dogs had lost their track at the Red River. The two later admitted that they had intended to escape by boat rather than by plane. [] the story had been partially distorted because such an escape was possible from an MND facility but not from Hoa Lo Prison. This was the only escape attempt [] ever heard of by American POW's in NVN. Both the MPS and the MND had reportedly developed special procedures to cope with attempted escapes, but both considered that Americans, because of their appearance, would be easily identified and apprehended.

[] any other escapes by American prisoners from NVN would have been staged to serve MPS or MND purposes.)

8. [] all foreign embassies in Hanoi had been placed under special observation. Special attention was paid to the Soviet, Czech and Polish embassies because it was anticipated that the American prisoners might seek shelter or asylum from those countries.

9. In answer to a query, [] speculated that Pho Lu, which was located near Lao Cai, was a logical site for the detention of American prisoners. Pho Lu, the site of several important factories, had been used in 1965 by a relatively large number of Communist Chinese laborers who were detailed to road construction projects in NVN. The Chinese were billeted in a camp located in or near Pho Lu.

[] considered Ba Sao a logical site for the detention of American prisoners because of the location of an MND installation there and because the MND was very active in Ba Sao.

[] not acquainted with Bat Sat, Coc Mi or Dam Dun and was not aware of any American prisoner of war detention sites at these locations. 1-3(a)(4)

10. In Hanoi, American prisoners were held at two separate detention areas. The first was located in the Ly Nam De area, bounded by WJ879265, WJ881264, WJ878259 and WJ881259. The second site was west of the dike at approximately WJ89752465. [] not aware of the location of any American prisoner detention sites at the WJ88322520 location, an area which he considered illogical for reasons of security. All buildings in this area were small and the many streets intersecting the area precluded establishing a maximum security detention facility. However, even prior to the bombing of Hanoi, [] detention facilities where American prisoners were held were relocated on occasion. 1-3(a)(4)

11. One of the most prevalent diseases afflicting American prisoners was cachexia. Cachexia referred basically to a deterioration in the physical condition of American prisoners. Their susceptibility to cachexia was attributed to a number of factors relating to the prisoners' state of physical and mental health prior to their capture. Prior to their capture, Americans were accustomed to generous diets and were not plagued with problems of morale. After their capture, although Americans were provided with what was considered a high food ration by North Vietnamese standards, they were denied meats, of which there was a shortage in NVN, and the wide variety of foods to which they had been accustomed. After capture, the Americans suffered from a depressed mental condition brought on by the shock of their incarceration and the interrogation to which they were subjected.

12. As a result, the physical condition of the American prisoners deteriorated because of the poor diet, the confined living conditions, and their depressed mental condition. The poor diet and the confined living conditions usually first caused a feeling of general fatigue. If the prisoners were neglected, the fatigue developed into a more advanced state of physical deterioration called cachexia, or into neurasthenia, which was a more severe or advanced form of physical and mental deterioration. Although prisoners suffering from general fatigue could recover through an improvement in their diet, those suffering from a severe case of cachexia required more than an improved diet, including generous supplies of vitamins, glucose, and blood plasma. Those suffering from neurasthenia were constantly tired, unable to sleep or rest, and in a state of almost total physical exhaustion. They also suffered from severe headaches. Those suffering from cachexia or neurasthenia, if neglected sufficiently long or if the treatment provided was inadequate, ultimately died.

13. Some American prisoners in NVN were described as being "hard core" (trung kien) types. However, neither the MPS nor the MND actually made official use of the "hard core" terminology in making professional reference to uncooperative Americans. The "hard core" expression was used only informally, to describe the intensity of feelings on the part of a certain group of American prisoners. The "hard core" expression was reportedly derived from other American prisoners who, when queried about the stubbornness and lack of cooperation on the part of some Americans, identified them as "hard core" types. Cooperative American prisoners told their interrogators that "hard core" American prisoners were those who had joined the U.S. military establishment (regardless of branch of service) without particular motivation or ideological convictions. 1-3(a)(4)

This type of individual was generally considered to have been unruly, boisterous and uncooperative even in his own military unit. [] the origin of the American POW's so described was not limited to any particular military service or region of service but rather included persons from any branch of service or any area of operation. These "hard core" types were generally considered by the interrogators to be adventurous and devoid of any deep-seated patriotic or ideological convictions. [] while reference was made to all American prisoners as a collective, discussions nonetheless generally revolved around American pilots, rather than ground force troops, because most important American prisoners in NVN were pilots.)

14. The more accurate terminology used both by the MPS and MND interrogators relating to these "hard core" American POW types was that they were "wayward (cung dau)" or "stubborn (ngoan co)" for the reasons described above. In spite of their lack of cooperation, such American prisoners were considered potentially valuable sources of information and suitable for future exploitation.

15. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC []

1.3(a)(4)

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Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

File ~~502-013~~ 501-08(6)

PAGE 1 OF 57 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. ☐

DATE DISTR. 10 December 1970

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DOI 1964-September 1969

SUBJECT Evacuation, Escape Attempts, Illnesses and Detention of American Prisoners of War

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (9 September 1970)

SOURCE ☐

FIELD NO. ☐

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
<input type="checkbox"/>							

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

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15. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC []

1.3(a)(4)

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UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Friedl, USMC
ATTENTION:
SUBJECT: Technical Analysis Results
REFERENCE: COOK Letter, undated

The following results were obtained through a technical analysis of the referenced letter:

Authentication: Not processed

Fingerprints: Not processed

Secret-Writing: Not processed

Results of Graphological Analysis:

Changes:	None	Slight	Medium	Strong
Intellectual		x		
Emotional			x	
Physical			x	

Special Remarks: The scope of the writer's mental functioning has become somewhat more restricted and his alertness is slightly decreased, although he seems to be constantly on guard. Apparently, he makes strong attempts at checking his emotions and impulses. He is considerably more withdrawn and defensive. Physically, he is noticeably weakened and uncomfortable. He evidently musters much willpower and persistence, in order to keep himself going as best he can under trying and detrimental conditions.

Enclosures: COOK Letter dated 21 Dec 64 - Orig
COOK Letter dated 13 Nov 64 - Orig
COOK Letter, undated - Orig

UNCLASSIFIED

0002



Intelligence Information Report

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/02289-71

DATE DISC. 11 August 1971

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DOI 1954 - 1969

SUBJECT Sketch of Hoa Lo Detention/Interrogation Center for American Prisoners in Hanoi

2-1876

ACQ

SOURCE

1. The sketch on page two is of the Hoa Lo Detention/Interrogation Center for American Prisoners in Hanoi. This facility is not the same as the Hoa Lo Prison located at WJ 883248. Comment: See TDCSDB-315/04435-71 for further details on the location and operations of this center. The center probably is located one block south of the location (WJ 88132408) reported in TDCSDB-315/04435-71; on Army Map Service Series L909, Edition 3, "Hanoi," scale 1:12,500, there is a complex of buildings at WJ 88052400 which closely resembles the detail provided in the enclosed sketch.)

2. Dissem: None

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 20 AUG 1979

SEE COVER SHEET FOR DISTRIBUTION


DIA #242

#331

1534

HOA-LO CENTER

NGUYEN THUONG HIEN STREET



64872 2-1875

REGIONAL OFFICE
PLANS

DIA NMCC/MC (ARMY NAVY AIR)
NIC (DAVIS ONLY)

STATE/DIR
SERVICE

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CITE TDCS DB-315/04435-71

151
DIST 4 AUGUST 1971

COUNTRY

NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

1954 - OCTOBER 1969

SUBJECT

HOA LO DETENTION/INTERROGATION CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PRISONERS IN HANOI

COPI NO 15

ACC

VIETNAM (7 JULY 1971)

SOURCE

TO STATE : NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. RAY-S. CLINE

TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GENERAL DONALD V. BENNETT

TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON

NAVY ACNO (INTEL), REAR ADMIRAL RECTANUS

AIR FORCE AF/IN, MAJOR GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR VICE ADMIRAL GAYLER

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 20 6/78

SOURCE

1533
INFO Card: ✓

Encl 241 (542601/00471)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: THE HOA LO CENTER WAS AN INSTALLATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY (MPS) FOR THE TEMPORARY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR. AS OF OCTOBER 1969, IT WAS LOCATED ON NGUYEN THONG HIEN STREET IN HANOI AND AT THAT TIME ABOUT 50 AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE DETAINED AT THE CENTER. INTERROGATORS WERE ENGLISH-SPEAKING NORTH VIETNAMESE MPS OFFICERS, AND DIFFERENT GROUPS INTERROGATED IN THE MORNINGS FROM 0700 TO 1100 HOURS AND THE AFTERNOONS FROM 1400 TO 1700 HOURS. COOPERATIVE PRISONERS WERE GIVEN SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, AND UNCOOPERATIVE ONES WERE BEATEN. THE MPS INTERROGATORS TRIED TO RECRUIT THE MOST COOPERATIVE PRISONERS BY PROMISING THEY WOULD BE RELEASED TO NEUTRAL COUNTRIES IF THEY WOULD AGREE TO REMAIN IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND ACTIVELY OPERATE AMONG ANTI-WAR GROUPS. PRISONERS WHO REMAINED UNCOOPERATIVE WERE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC EXHIBITION WHEREVER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ORGANIZED PRISONER PARADES. PRISONERS WERE GIVEN THE SAME

[REDACTED]

MEALS AS THE CENTER STAFF. SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTER WERE HANDLED BY A 36-MAN MPS SECURITY PLATOON. THIRTY-ONE MPS GUARDS MAINTAINED 24-HOUR SECURITY IN AND AROUND THE INSTALLATION. BEFORE 1954, THE COMPOUND OCCUPIED BY THE HOA LO CENTER WAS THE LOCATION OF AN ELEMENT OF THE FRENCH SECURITY SERVICES. THE AREA WAS TAKEN OVER BY THE MPS IN LATE 1963 OR 1964. END SUMMARY.

1. THE HOA LO CENTER (TRUNG TAM HOA LO) OR THE HOA LO BRANCH (NGANH HOA LO) IN HANOI WAS AN MPS INSTALLATION FOR THE TEMPORARY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR. AS OF OCTOBER 1969 IT WAS LOCATED AT VJ98132408 ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF NGUYEN THUONG HIEN STREET, APPROXIMATELY FIVE METERS FROM THE INTERSECTION OF NGUYEN THUONG HIEN AND TRAN DINH TRONG STREETS.

COMMENT: [REDACTED] THE HOA LO CENTER SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE HOA LO PRISON LOCATED AT VJ98132408.)

THE HOA LO CENTER HANDLED ONLY AMERICAN OFFICERS OF COMPANY AND FIELD RANK, ALL THE PRISONERS WERE PILOTS OR AIR CREW MEMBERS SHOT DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CENTER DID NOT HANDLE CAPTIVES BROUGHT FROM SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN). SOME PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN IN THE PROVINCES AROUND HANOI WERE [REDACTED]

[IN OCTOBER 1969] [REDACTED] APPROXIMATELY 50 AMERICAN PRISONERS AT THE CENTER AND ESTIMATED THAT THE COMPOUND COULD HOLD FROM 60 TO 70 PRISONERS AT ONE TIME. NONE OF THE PRISONERS [REDACTED] HAD BROKEN OR AMPUTATED LIMBS AND NONE WAS WEARING A CAST OR USING CRUTCHES. HOWEVER, MOST OF THEM WERE THIN, PALE, WEAK AND DEJECTED-LOOKING.

2. INTERROGATORS AT THE CENTER WERE ALL ENGLISH-SPEAKING NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS OF THE MPS WHO WERE NOT PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE CENTER. INTERROGATIONS TOOK PLACE FROM 0700 TO 1100 IN THE MORNING AND FROM 1400 TO 1700 HOURS IN THE AFTERNOON. A DIFFERENT GROUP OF INTERROGATORS WORKED IN THE MORNINGS FROM THOSE ON DUTY IN THE AFTERNOONS. NO INTERROGATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BETWEEN 1700 AND 0700 HOURS. [REDACTED] ESTIMATED THAT THE INSTALLATION HAD APPROXIMATELY 10 INTERROGATION ROOMS JUDGING BY THE SIZE OF THE BUILDING. [REDACTED]

DURING [REDACTED] TRIPS TO THE CENTER [REDACTED] SAW NO FOREIGN ADVISERS.

THAT COOPERATIVE PRISONERS WERE GIVEN

[REDACTED]

special privileges and uncooperative ones were beaten. Rewards for cooperation included extra food rations and cigarettes as well as tours of Hanoi and surrounding area. The NPS interrogators attempted to recruit the most cooperative prisoners by promising they would be released to neutral countries if they would agree to remain in those countries and actively operate among anti-Vietnam war groups. Their mission would be to downgrade U.S. participation in the Vietnam war and attempt to swing world opinion in favor of the North Vietnamese cause. [REDACTED] did not tell [REDACTED] whether any Americans had actually been released to any neutral country. Uncooperative prisoners were promised female companionship if they agreed to cooperate with their interrogators. [REDACTED] said that such tactics worked with some, but not all the prisoners. Prisoners who remained uncooperative were subjected to public exhibition whenever the North Vietnamese government organized prisoner parades. Prisoners paraded through the streets of Hanoi were often cursed, stoned and even beaten by bystanders who broke through the lines of security guards protecting the prisoners.

4. Prisoners at the Hoa Lo center were given the same

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MEALS AS STAFF MEMBERS. DURING THE MORNING THE PRISONERS RECEIVED A HALF LOAF OF BREAD. AT THE NOON AND EVENING MEALS THE PRISONERS WERE GIVEN A MEDIUM-SIZED BOWL OF RICE, A PORTION OF VEGETABLES AND EITHER FRESH OR CANNED MEAT OR FISH. THE MEALS AT THE CENTER WERE PREPARED BY FOUR INMATES OF CIVIL PRISONS IN HANOI. AT THE END OF THE DAY THE FOUR COOKS WERE DETAINED IN A ROOM ADJACENT TO THE KITCHEN.

3. THE SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOA LO CENTER WERE HANDLED BY A 36-MAN MPS SECURITY PLATOON. AN MPS ASPIRANT, ONE DEPUTY AND THREE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL OPERATED THE CENTER. THIRTY-ONE MPS GUARDS MAINTAINED 24-HOUR SECURITY IN AND AROUND THE INSTALLATION. GUARDS ON NIGHT DUTY WORKED SHIFTS OF ONE HOUR ON AND ONE HOUR OFF. TWO GUARDS WERE POSTED AT THE ENTRANCE TO EACH OF THE TWO WINGS OF DETENTION CELLS. COMMENT: [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW THE DAYTIME GUARD SCHEDULE OR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF GUARDS ON DUTY AT ANY ONE TIME. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENT LIVED IN A BARRACKS FOR MPS CADRES LOCATED NEAR THE CENTER. THE 31 MPS GUARDS LIVED AT THE CENTER AND WERE ALLOWED TO SPEND THEIR LEISURE TIME IN HANOI.

(Classification)

(Dissem Control)

6. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE HOA LO CENTER COMPOUND WAS FORMERLY THE LOCATION OF AN ELEMENT OF THE FRENCH SECURITY SERVICES. WHEN THE COMMUNIST REGIME TOOK POWER IN 1954, THE COMPOUND BECAME A CIVIL PRISON FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE CRIMINALS. [REDACTED] WAS NOT CERTAIN WHEN THE MPS TOOK OVER THIS INSTALLATION, [REDACTED] THE HOA LO CENTER BECAME AN MPS INTERROGATION FACILITY IN LATE 1963 OR 1964.

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, MINISTER COUNSELOR POLITICAL) USMACV. (GENERAL ABRAMS, MAJOR GENERAL POTTS) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL CLAY, BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN) [REDACTED] TO CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT [REDACTED]

(Classification)

(Dissem Control)



Intelligence Information Report

SF

2-1889

[REDACTED]

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[REDACTED]

REPORT NO. CS-311/06253-71

DATE DISTR. 26 AUGUST 1971

REF: SICR D-6CX-26906

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 1967

SUBJECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING SITE FOR CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE AND INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PAMPHLET ON TREATMENT OF AMERICANS CAPTURED IN NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

Rec'd 27 Sep 71
Rec'd 13 Sep

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 20 AUG 1976

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NCA	
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(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

CAMP LOG # C-95

REPORT LOG # 1537

1:50,000 Coord: ✓

1:250,000 Coord: ✓

UTM Card: ✓

WJ 381588

HF 45
605 J
L 7-11

#70

Encl 244 (S-47,601/004H)

DIA #244

130000 0000

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTARY TO THAT IN CS-311/04439-71 [REDACTED] AND IS BASED ON [REDACTED]

2. AS OF JUNE 1967, THE BUILDING AT THE LAM THAO SUPERPHOSPHATE PLANT USED AS A PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING POINT FOR U.S. PILOTS SHOT DOWN OVER VINH PHU PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM, WAS APPROXIMATELY FIVE STORIES HIGH AND WAS SQUARE-SHAPED WITH A FLAT ROOF. THERE WERE FOUR CYLINDRICAL TANKS AND A FLAGPOLE ON TOP OF THE BUILDING (POINT 4 ON ENCLOSURE 1). THIS BUILDING WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY SIX METERS FROM THE ENTRANCE GATE (POINT 5 ON ENCLOSURE 1). THE BUILDINGS LOCATED AT POINTS 1, 2 AND 3 ON ENCLOSURE 1 CONTAINED A KITCHEN, DINING ROOMS AND A GARAGE FOR VEHICLES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE OTHER BUILDINGS BECAUSE HE HAD NEVER BEEN ALLOWED INSIDE THE PLANT AREA. WHEN HE AND THE OTHER STUDENTS PERFORMED GUARD DUTY, THEY WERE POSTED OUTSIDE THE GATE ALONG THE ROAD LEADING TO THE PLANT. ENCLOSURE 2 IS A COPY OF [REDACTED] SKETCH OF THE PLANT. POINT 1 ON ENCLOSURE 2 IS THE BUILDING USED TO DEBRIEF THE PRISONERS.)

3. APPROXIMATELY 22 STUDENTS FROM THE LAM THAO THIRD-LEVEL SCHOOL WERE SELECTED BY THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT FOR GUARD DUTY AT THE DEBRIEFING POINT WHEN PRISONERS ARRIVED AT THE PLANT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: CS 311/04439-71 [REDACTED] REPORTED ERRONEOUSLY THE LAM THAO SCHOOL WAS A SECOND-LEVEL SCHOOL. [REDACTED] IT WAS THIRD-LEVEL.) THE SCHOOL WAS LOCATED ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS FROM THE SUPERPHOSPHATE PLANT NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF TWO ROADS, THE ONE BETWEEN VIET TRI CITY AND LAM NGHIA HAMLET AND THE OTHER BETWEEN LAM THAO VILLAGE GOING TO THE SON VY AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE (SEE ENCLOSURE 3 FOR [REDACTED] DRAWING OF THE SCHOOL AND ITS SURROUNDINGS). THE MAIN BUILDINGS OF THE SCHOOL WERE CONSTRUCTED OF CEMENT BLOCKS AND BRICK

WALLS; THEY HAD RED TILE ROOFS. MOST OF THE BUILDINGS WERE IN OPEN AREAS AND COULD BE SEEN EASILY FROM THE AIR. COMMENT: ENCLOSURE 3 IS A SKETCH OF THE SCHOOL BASED ON A PRELIMINARY SKETCH

4. PRIOR TO BEGINNING THEIR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENTS AS GUARDS AT THE DEBRIEFING SITE, THE STUDENTS WERE GIVEN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. THEY WERE TOLD TO TREAT THEM WITH RESPECT AND TO INSURE THAT THE VILLAGERS ALSO BEHAVED RESPECTFULLY TOWARD THE PRISONERS. THE STUDENTS WERE TOLD TO CORRECT ANY OF THE VILLAGERS WHO VIOLATED THIS RULE AND TO SEND THEM AWAY FROM THE AREA IF THEY CONTINUED TO MISBEHAVE. WHILE VILLAGERS WERE PERMITTED TO SEE THE PRISONERS AND MAKE COMMENTS TO THEM, THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR MOVEMENTS OR INTERRUPT THE DEBRIEFINGS.

5. THE MAIN DOCUMENT USED TO PREPARE THE STUDENTS FOR THEIR GUARD DUTY WAS A PAMPHLET ENTITLED "POLICY ON TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS" WHICH WAS AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR A SMALL PRICE AND WHICH ALL CIVILIANS WERE ENCOURAGED TO PURCHASE. THE PAMPHLET WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAIN PARTS: THE FIRST DEALT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH CIVILIAN WHO CAME IN CONTACT WITH U.S. PILOTS FROM THE TIME OF INITIAL SIGHTING TO THEIR TURNOVER TO PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICIALS. PART TWO CONTAINED A NUMBER OF PHRASES IN ENGLISH AND VIETNAMESE TO BE USED FOR COMMUNICATION WITH PILOTS; MOST OF THEM CONCERNED HEALTH MATTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO REMOVE CLOTHES, NOT TO RUN AWAY AND TO FOLLOW THEIR CAPTORS. THE THIRD PART OF THE PAMPHLET PROVIDED SKETCHES OF VARIOUS U.S. AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS AND IDENTIFIED THEM; IT ALSO PROVIDED INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING COVER DURING AIR ATTACKS AND FOR SELF-PROTECTION. THE FINAL SECTION OF THE PAMPHLET CONCERNED THE PILOTS, WHAT THEY LIKED TO EAT, HEALTH PRECAUTIONS AND HOW TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR SAFETY.

6. THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE PAMPHLET CONCERNED DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE PRISONER FROM THE TIME HE WAS SPOTTED. FIRST, HE WAS SEARCHED FOR WEAPONS AND ANY SUSPICIOUS ITEMS HE MIGHT


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
HAVE IN HIS POSSESSION. THE SEARCH INCLUDED THE NOSE, EARS, SHOES AND POCKETS. THE PRISONER WAS THEN MOVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AWAY FROM THE SITE OF HIS CAPTURE. IF THERE WAS A PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE NEAR, THE PRISONER WAS TAKEN THERE; IF NOT, HE WAS TAKEN TO THE CLOSEST VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE. IF THE PILOT WAS INJURED, FIRST AID WAS ADMINISTERED; IF THE WOUND WERE SERIOUS, HE WAS TAKEN TO THE NEAREST MEDICAL INSTALLATION. THE LIFE OF THE PRISONER WAS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AND TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER REPORTING THE CAPTURE TO SECURITY OFFICIALS.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE NAVFORV CINCPAC
PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED]

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO
CS-311/06253-71

SUPER PHOSPHATE PLANT






DRAWING
OF SUPER PHOSPHATE PLANT

ANNOTATIONS

1. Soccer field.
2. Teacher dining area.
3. Garden.
4. Teacher living quarters.
5. Water well.
6. Water closet.
7. Pig pen.
8. Garden.
9. Fish pond & swimming area.
10. Physics/Chemistry laboratory.
11. Classrooms.
12. Library and snack bar.
13. Conference hall.
14. Volleyball field.
15. Water closet.
16. Experimental garden.
17. Topography training field.
18. Bell pond.
19. Direction of Viet Tri city.
20. Lam Nghia hamlet.
21. Son Vy cooperative.
22. Super phosphate plant.
23. Lam Thao village.
24. Red River.



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
118-72

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COUNTRY North Vietnam
DOI July 1968
SUBJECT Death of an American Pilot beaten by North Vietnamese, Mi-
litiamen attributed to suicide.
ACQ
SOURCE



Approved for Release
Date 1 MAY 1976

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

1. At about 1100 hours on an unknown date early in June 1968 [] this is a lunar calendar date. [] did not know the Gregorian calendar date but assumed it would have been July 1968). [] observed the pilot of a burning US jet aircraft bail out and land in Hang Do Hamlet rice field (HU707552) of Ba Hien Village, Binh Xuyen District, Vinh Phu Province, North Vietnam (NVA). [] went to the field to see the pilot and when he reached the area he observed that the pilot had been captured, had been stripped down to his shorts and had his hands tied. Militiamen and Villagers of Ba Hien Village area [] was unable to locate on the map but it was near the crash site) were beating him with sticks and handle end of machetes as they led him toward the Ba Hien Village Administrative Office ([] left the area before the Prisoner of war was taken into the Office and did not see him again.). [] []: Map reference: AMS L7014, sheet 6151-IV, 1:50,000.)

2. On the same day following the observation [] talked about the capture of the pilot to people of Ba Hien Village and they said there was rumor that the pilot had committed suicide by poisoning himself while being driven to Binh Xuyen District town. Still later, on another day, [] talked to ³unidentified Ba Hien Ba Hien villagers and this villager said that a cadre friend of the Binh Xuyen District Militia unit had told him that the Doctor of the Vinh Phu Province Public Health Service had conducted an autopsy and confirmed that the pilot had committed suicide by taking poison. Two weeks after the capture [] read a Combat Achievement list that was published by the Binh Xuyen District Militia in which it was reported that the dead pilot had been flying an F-105 aircraft out of Thailand, that he had been a Captain, and a native of California []: further details were not provided.

3. The pilot was a caucasian, was about 1.8 meter tall, weighed 75 or 80 kilograms, had short curly yellow hair, and blue eyes. His body was covered with bruises from the beating he received but he otherwise appeared to be unscathed and healthy. [] observed that he used a [] and red parachute.

0 - 3 -

4.



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